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DECONSTRUCTING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE:
ABSOLUTE DIRECTOR PRIMACY
René Reich-Graefe*
ABSTRACT
Microtheoretical models of the corporation which focus on corporate
governance attempt to answer two deceptively simple, but fundamentally
elusive questions: ‘Who are in control of the corporation?’ and ‘Whose
interests ultimately control those in control of the corporation?’ Both
questions remain partially unanswered within the models developed to date
by corporate theoreticians. This Article proposes a radically new model:
‘absolute director primacy.’ Existing microtheoretical models conceive that
we only need to—and, indeed, can—determine the controlling interests
guiding corporate decisionmaking in order to prove the existence of control
over the decisionmaking latitude of corporate boards. The absolute director
primacy model reverses this thinking: The corporate board—as the privatesector equivalent of a modern Leviathan—has absolute and infinite
decisionmaking latitude in order to control the business and affairs of the
corporation. Nothing within corporate law provides any meaningful
modicum of predictive ability regarding director behavior ex ante or
director accountability ex post. As a result, model-immanent explanations
of the phenomenon of general investor confidence pre-investment in the
face of absent director accountability post-investment become logically
impossible. Thus, the absolute director primacy model not only posits a
complete absence of ex-post director accountability but accepts the
complete ex-ante indeterminability of director decisionmaking.
Accordingly, the absolute director primacy model further posits that largely
unexplained and currently unaccounted-for protolegal variables control
both director behavior and the microtheoretical models of the firm that
attempt to explain and predict such behavior.
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Aut tace, aut loquere meliora silentio. [Be silent unless to
speak is better than silence.]
—Salvator Rosa (1615-73), Self Portrait (National Gallery, London)

I. OPENING SKETCHES
Whether we like it or not:1 “the genius of American corporate law”2 is
autocratic and elitist—and, possibly, totalitarian.3 Such qualities are most
pronounced when the genius is employed by discreet structurations of
economic concentration operating in the form of the modern Berle-Means
corporation.4 Corporate law—commonly regarded as a well-functioning
1. As has been observed before, (at least, some) “[w]affling is obligatory to law-review
writing.” See J. Mark Ramseyer, Economizing Legal D-B8, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 25, 29 n.12
(2005).
2. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 1, 151 (1993); Fred S.
McChesney, The “Trans Union” Case: Smith v. Van Gorkom, in THE ICONIC CASES IN
CORPORATE LAW 231, 256 (Jonathan R. Macey ed., 2008) [hereinafter McChesney, The “Trans
Union” Case]. Cf. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 3 (2008) [hereinafter BAINBRIDGE, THEORY AND PRACTICE]. Even though the
reference is to American corporate law, it is often claimed, as part of the so-called ‘convergence
debate,’ that such genius of American corporate law is more and more universally accepted. See,
e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the Convergence Debate, 16
TRANSNAT’L LAW. 45, 45 (2002) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Convergence Debate]; Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Essay, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439,
439, 468 (2001) [hereinafter Hansmann & Kraakman, The End of History].
3. Cf. Kenneth J. Arrow, Scale Returns in Communication and Elite Control of
Organizations, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 6 (1991) (describing how elite control of organizations is
necessary in order to achieve economies of scale within the communication and decision flows of
organizations); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 557 (2003) [hereinafter Bainbridge, The Means and Ends]
(comparing the central decisionmaker in large public corporations to “an autocrat”); id. at 555
(stating that “public corporations are not participatory democracies, but hierarchies in which
decisions are made on a fairly authoritarian basis”); Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and
Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1703, 1718-26 (1989) (discussing
(disguised) elite rulemaking in corporate law as one of the sources for corporate law rules);
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise on Corporate Law: Filling Manning’s
Empty Towers, 31 J. CORP. L. 599, 604 (2006) [hereinafter Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise]
(inquiring whether corporate boards are “mediating plutocrats”); id. at 604 n.21 (asking whether
“we want to encourage an institution that is disproportionately white, male and conservative to
make social policy?”); Jeswald W. Salacuse, Corporate Governance, Culture, and Convergence:
Corporations American Style or With a European Touch?, 9 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 33, 56 (2003)
(“[T]he CEO in the modern American corporation is like that of a third-world autocrat.”).
4. The legal and economic nature of the publicly held corporation, with widely disbursed
shareownership and an almost complete separation of ownership and control, was first thoroughly
analyzed and established as a distinct subject of corporate law study by Adolf Berle and Gardiner
Means. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND

2011]

Deconstructing Corporate Governance

343

enabling framework5 for economic liberty and private-party
entrepreneurship6—is the principal legal vehicle utilized in order to remove
large areas of economic activity from free-market forces and to internalize
and concentrate such activity in planned economies under an absolutist,
hierarchical command-and-control structure.7 These market-insulated,
planned economies8 are not centralist state economies (in which case the
PRIVATE PROPERTY 84–89, 119–25 (1932). But see FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND
PROFIT 291 (1921) (“The typical form of business unit in the modern world is the corporation. Its
most important characteristic is the combination of diffused ownership with concentrated
control.”). See also STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 3–5, 72 (2d ed. 2009)
[hereinafter BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW]; JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN,
CORPORATIONS 39–40 (2d ed. 2003); Bainbridge, Convergence Debate, supra note 2, at 46;
William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 737,
739–40, 753–59 (2001) [hereinafter Bratton, Century’s Turn]; Oliver Hart, An Economist’s View
of Fiduciary Duty, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 299, 303 n.9 (1993) [hereinafter Hart, An Economist’s
View]; David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 214; Charles R.T.
O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur and the Theory of the Modern Corporation, 31 J. CORP. L. 753, 754
(2006) [hereinafter O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation]; Arthur R. Pinto, An Overview
of United States Corporate Governance in Publicly Traded Corporations, 58 AM. J. COMP. L.
257, 259–60 (2010). On the legacy of Berle and Means and their groundbreaking research, see
generally Kelli A. Alces, Revisiting Berle and Rethinking the Corporate Structure, 33 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 787 (2010); William W. Bratton, Jr. & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s
Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99 (2008)
[hereinafter Bratton & Wachter, Corporatist Origins]; William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter,
Tracking Berle’s Footsteps: The Trail of The Modern Corporation’s Last Chapter, 33 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 849 (2010); Charles R. T. O’Kelley, Berle and the Entrepreneur, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
1141 (2010); Harwell Wells, The Birth of Corporate Governance, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1247
(2010). Hence the moniker ‘Berle-Means corporation’ in order to designate such type of public
corporation, as well as the term ‘Berle-Means paradigm’ in order to describe the intellectual
framework that has informed the study of large publicly-held corporations ever since. See, e.g.,
O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation, supra at 759; Bratton, Century’s Turn, supra at
737.
5. William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1395, 1400 (1993) [hereinafter Allen, Contracts and Communities]; Edward B. Rock &
Michael L. Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law: Introduction, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 1608,
1617 (2001) [hereinafter Rock & Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law].
6. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Separation and the Function of Corporation Law, 2 BERKELEY
BUS. L.J. 141, 147 (2005) [hereinafter Gilson, Separation and Function] (pointing out that
“markets encourage a management and governance structure that fits the corporation’s business”
and that “[c]orporate law has nothing to add to the process”); Milton Friedman, The Social
Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970 [hereinafter
Friedman, Social Responsibility].
7. Cf. ERIC HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EXTREMES 103 (1994) (describing how intellectuals
and policy makers early in the 20th century already observed that an economy dominated by huge
corporations made nonsense of the term ‘perfect competition’). See also Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Competing Concepts of the Corporation (a.k.a. Criteria? Just Say No), 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 77,
81 (2005) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Just Say No]; Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3,
at 555; Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and
the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 827–28 (1999); O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern
Corporation, supra note 4; Rock & Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law, supra note 5, at 1617.
8. Cf. D. H. ROBERTSON, THE CONTROL OF INDUSTRY 85 (1923) (stating that firms are
“islands of conscious power in this ocean of unconscious co-operation [namely, the market], like
lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk”); G.B. Richardson, The Organisation of
Industry, 82 ECON. J. 883, 883 (1972) (describing firms in general as “islands of planned co-
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orthodox view would classify them as socialist or nonmarket economies).9
They are what economists and corporate theorists call ‘firms.’10 And the
modern Berle-Means corporation, the type of firm with the largest
concentration of economic power and the greatest amount of economic
separation from the market,11 has become the functional aliud of nonmarket
economies in the sphere of post-capitalist12 industrial organization.
Operating in tandem with global economies of scale,13 the genius of
ordination in a sea of market relations”). See also Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4
ECONOMICA 386, 393 (1937).
These, then, are the reasons why organisations such as firms exist in a specialised
exchange economy in which it is generally assumed that the distribution of resources is
“organised” by the price mechanism. A firm, therefore, consists of the system of
relationships which comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent
on an entrepreneur.
Id.; Walter W. Powell, Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization, 12 RES.
ORGAN. BEHAV. 295, 297 (1990); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious
Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1621 (2001)
[hereinafter Rock & Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power].
9. Cf. Robert G. Eccles & Harrison C. White, Price and Authority in Inter-Profit Center
Transactions, 94 AM. J. SOC. S17, S18 (1988) (comparing firms with planned economies);
Michael J. Meurer, Law, Economics, and the Theory of the Firm, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 727, 737
(2004).
The nature of the firm puzzles economists because the classic hierarchical firm
displaces the price signals used to guide economic activity in the market with the same
kind of fiat that guides economic activity in planned economies. The parallel between a
firm and a planned economy is strong. The control rights to its assets are held
collectively, as are the returns from these assets. It is puzzling to find capitalist
economies so fully embracing an apparently inefficient mode of organization.
Meurer, supra (footnote omitted).
10. Cf. Rock & Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power, supra note 8. There is, of course, also a
colloquial, plain-English meaning of the ‘firm’ which similarly describes a business enterprise.
See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 438–39 (10th ed. 1996).
11. Cf. Coase, supra note 8, at 388 (asking “in view of the fact that it is usually argued that coordination will be done by the price mechanism, why is such organization necessary?” and then
explaining that the “firm . . . consists of the system of relationships which comes into existence
when the direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur”). See COX & HAZEN, supra note
4, at 40; Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5, at 1398; Michael P. Dooley, Two
Models of Corporate Governance, 47 BUS. LAW. 461, 464 (1992); Mark Granovetter, Business
Groups and Social Organization, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 429, 429 (Neil J.
Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., 2000) [hereinafter Granovetter, Business Groups]; Meurer,
supra note 9; Powell, supra note 8, at 296–97; Rock & Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power,
supra note 8. See also Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of
Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 692 (1986)
(differentiating between specific rights and residual rights in order to explain firm boundaries);
Oliver D. Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON.
1119, 1119 (1990) (setting forth a framework for addressing the question of “when transactions
should be carried out within the firm and when through the market”).
12. Cf. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust and Team Production in Post-Capitalist Society, 24 J.
CORP. L. 869 (1999) [hereinafter Mitchell, Trust and Team Production].
13. Cf. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 4; ROBERT CHARLES CLARK,
CORPORATE LAW 2 (1986) [hereinafter CLARK, CORPORATE LAW].
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American corporate law has enabled economic behemoths of private
ordering that not only rival but regularly exceed the productivity and
financial wherewithal of nation-state economies.14
Consider an oft-cited example in this context: Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
(Wal-Mart).15 As the world’s largest, fully-integrated retailing business,16
Wal-Mart accumulates to nothing more than a fiction in the legal realm17—a
corporation organized under the laws of the State of Delaware.18 Its almost
four billion outstanding shares of common stock19 are principally traded on
the New York Stock Exchange,20 but its almost 300,000 shareholders21 will
never be able to touch22 what they own23—in most cases, not even in the
14. See, e.g., Allison D. Garrett, The Corporation as Sovereign, 60 ME. L. REV. 129, 131
(2008); Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, in THE ICONIC CASES IN
CORPORATE LAW 1, 10 (Jonathan R. Macey ed., 2008) [hereinafter Stout, Why We Should Stop
Teaching Dodge v. Ford].
15. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 14, at 146–48; Kent Greenfield, New Principles For
Corporate Law, 1 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 87, 101 (2005); Benedict Sheehy, Corporations and Social
Costs: The Wal-Mart Case Study, 24 J.L. & COM. 1, 33–49 (2004); Stout, Why We Should Stop
Teaching Dodge v. Ford, supra note 14, at 10.
16. See Corporate Facts: Wal-Mart by the Numbers, WALMARTSTORES.COM, 2 (Mar. 2010),
http://walmartstores.com/download/2230.pdf [hereinafter Wal-Mart Corporate Facts].
17. The corporation is a human invention, a fictitious ‘legal’ person. See, e.g., Trs. of
Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819) (“A corporation is an artificial being,
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
307 (5th ed. 1979) (listing “artificial person” within the definition of corporation); BAINBRIDGE,
CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 1; CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 13, at 15; Allen,
Contracts and Communities, supra note 5; Bernhard Grossfeld, Management and Control of
Marketable Share Companies, in 13 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch.
4, § 2, at 4 (Alfred Conard & Detlev Vagts eds., 2006); Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976); Christopher D. Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the
Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1980) (“persona ficta”); Stout, Why We Should
Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, supra note 14, at 11. Arguably, all of corporate law (indeed, all of
law) is a human invention and, therefore, fictitious. Cf. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 13,
at 15.
18. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Apr. 1, 2009), available at
http://ccbn.10kwizard.com/xml/download.php?format=PDF&ipage=6245246 [hereinafter WalMart Form 10-K 2009].
19. As of March 27, 2009, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. had 3,915,118,871 shares of common stock
outstanding. See id. at 1.
20. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.: Listing Profile, NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE,
http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/wmt.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2011); Wal-Mart Form 10-K
2009, supra note 18, at 18.
21. As of March 27, 2009, Wal-Mart had 298,263 common stock shareholders of record. See
Wal-Mart Form 10-K 2009, supra note 18, at 18; WAL-MART STORES, INC., 2009 ANNUAL
REPORT 56, available at http://walmartstores.com/download/3661.pdf [hereinafter WAL-MART
2009 ANNUAL REPORT].
22. Or see, hear, feel, smell or taste—not that they would really care to. Cf. Stout, Why We
Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, supra note 14, at 11 (stating that “[c]orporations are purely
legal creatures, without flesh, blood, or bone”). Since the corporation is a human invention, there
is no way of truly reifying the same. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 117–18 (10th ed. 2007);
Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 552–53; Grossfeld, supra note 17. Though it
should be noted that, etymologically, the word ‘firm’ (from the Latin ‘firmare’ [= to make firm]
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form of a physical share certificate.24 What makes this legal fiction tangible,
however, and indeed a vast economic reality is that Wal-Mart owns,
controls and operates an enormous empire of productive resources which
generates superlatives in the global marketplace on an Olympian scale: net
sales of $401.2 billion in its 2008 fiscal year;25 a market capitalization of
close to $220 billion at the end of 2008 (ranking Wal-Mart, at the time, the
third-largest publicly listed enterprise by market capitalization in the
world);26 sourcing and moving 5.5 billion cases of merchandise27 through a
fully integrated supply chain into 7,873 stores worldwide;28 all of which
facilitated by a global sales force of 2.1 million people29 serving about
four million customers weekly30 in fifteen different countries of operation.31
To put it differently: Wal-Mart serves as the nerve center—the central hub
and ‘firmus’ [= firm, solid]—similarly, for example, in German ‘Firma’) has exactly that reifying
and solidifying meaning. It also means the signature or name under which the business operates,
another distinct and exclusive way to denote the idea of something autonomously existing in the
marketplace above and beyond the existence of the individual firm participants. See, e.g.,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 438–39 (10th ed. 1996). See also Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (“A corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals
under an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity.”); HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP
OF ENTERPRISE 18–19 (1996) (defining the firm as “the common signatory of a group of
contracts” and continuing that “[i]n small firms organized as sole proprietorships, the individual
proprietor signs these contracts [but i]n a corporation or a partnership, the party that signs the
contracts is a legal entity”).
23. There is debate among strands of current corporate theory as to whether shareholders can
indeed ‘own’ the corporation. The ‘contractarian’ model of corporate theory denies that such is the
case. See, e.g., Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3 passim; Eisenberg, supra note 7, at
825–26 (arguing that shareholders own the corporation since they possess most of the incidents of
ownership or property rights; thus, stock ownership is private property); Friedman, Social
Responsibility, supra note 6 (stating that “[i]n a free enterprise, private-property system, the
corporate executive is an employee of the owners of the business” and “[i]nsofar as his actions . . .
reduce returns to stockholders, he is spending their money”).
24. Many of Wal-Mart’s shareholders will hold their shares issued in ‘street name,’ i.e.,
through their bank, broker, trustee or other financial agent. These financial intermediaries will be
registered as the shareholders of record and the share certificates will be made out in their name
rather than in the name of the actual, i.e., beneficial holders, of Wal-Mart common stock and will
be endorsed in blank. See, e.g., COX & HAZEN, supra note 4, at 485; RICHARD W. HAMILTON &
RICHARD A. BOOTH, BLACK LETTER OUTLINES: CORPORATIONS 888 (5th ed. 2006).
25. Wal-Mart Form 10-K 2009, supra note 18, at 3. It should be noted that the fiscal year of
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ends on January 31 each calendar year. See id. at 3; WAL-MART 2009
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 56. Nevertheless, for ease of comparison with various
national and the international gross domestic products hereinafter, I shall treat Wal-Mart’s fiscal
year ended January 31, 2009 to have coincided with the 2008 calendar year.
26. See FT Global 500: Market Values and Prices, FIN. TIMES, 1 (Dec. 31, 2008),
http://media.ft.com/cms/b5e2c024-dd89-11dd-930e-000077b07658.pdf.
27. See Walmart: A Leader in Logistics, WALMARTSTORES.COM, 1 (May 2009),
http://walmartstores.com/download/2336.pdf.
28. Wal-Mart Form 10-K 2009, supra note 18, at 3–9; WAL-MART 2009 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 21, at 55.
29. Wal-Mart Form 10-K 2009, supra note 18, at 11; WAL-MART 2009 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 21, at 2.
30. See Wal-Mart Corporate Facts, supra note 16, at 2.
31. Wal-Mart Form 10-K 2009, supra note 18, at 3.
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firm32—of a private enterprise that can lay claim to being the largest-scale
and most efficient human-built real-time supply-chain operation that ever
existed.
If, for a moment, one only focuses on Wal-Mart’s 2008 net sales as a
benchmark and compares those net sales on a dollar-for-dollar basis, the
staggering result is that Wal-Mart concentrated in such fiscal year an
economic productivity which equaled approximately 2.8% of the 2008
gross domestic product (GDP) of the United States.33 In other words: all it
took in 2008 were fewer than thirty-six companies the size of Wal-Mart to
eclipse the entire productivity of the United States—the nation with the
highest productivity in the world34—as measured by gross domestic
product.35 And the entire human productive output of our planet—as
measured in 2008 world GDP by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—
was the equivalent of only 151 Wal-Marts.36 The 2008 net revenues
generated by Wal-Mart exceeded the individual 2008 GDPs of OECD
member countries like Greece, Denmark, Ireland or Portugal, respectively.37
Wal-Mart’s 2008 productivity matched the combined aggregated GDPs of
the bottom seventy-three countries of the 181 national economies ranked by
the IMF according to gross domestic productivity in 2008.38 If Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. were a nation state, it would have been the twenty-sixth largest
national economy in the world in 2008.39 Thus, for a private enterprise,
Wal-Mart concentrates and wields vast amounts of economic and
sociopolitical power while it distributes vast amounts of economic wealth

32. For a description of the concept of the ‘hub firm’ used by economists in order to describe
what lawyers would usually call the top holding company in a corporate group, see generally
Bernard Baudry & David Gindis, The V-Network Form: Economic Organization and the Theory
of the Firm (Oct. 10, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=795244.
33. The 2008 U.S. GDP was $14,264.6 billion. News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce,
Bureau of Economic Analysis, Gross Domestic Product: First Quarter 2009 (Final) / Corporate
Profits: First Quarter 2009 (Revised), Table 3 (June 25, 2009), http://www.bea.gov/
newsreleases/national/gdp/2009/pdf/gdp109f.pdf. Wal-Mart’s $ 401.2 billion net sales in fiscal
2008 divided by $14,264.6 billion equals approximately 0.2812557 (or 2.812557%).
34. See World Economic Outlook Database April 2009, INT’L MONETARY FUND,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/index.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2011)
[hereinafter World Economic Outlook Database] (listing relevant information that may be
downloaded in spreadsheet form).
35. 100% (i.e., all of the 2008 U.S. GDP) divided by 2.8125569% (i.e., Wal-Mart’s
comparative productivity in fiscal 2008 measured by net sales) equals approximately
35.55483549.
36. The 2008 world GDP, as measured by the IMF, was $60,689.812 billion. World Economic
Outlook Database, supra note 34. Wal-Mart’s $401.2 billion net sales in fiscal 2008 divided by
$60,689.812 billion equals approximately 0.00661066 (or 0.661066%). 100% (i.e., all of the 2008
world GDP) divided by 0.661066% (i.e., Wal-Mart’s comparative productivity in fiscal 2008
measured by net sales) equals approximately 151.27071785.
37. World Economic Outlook Database, supra note 34.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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as well as vast amounts of social costs.40 As an inevitable result, “the ugly
problem of political legitimacy raises its head.”41
Given this economic megapolity, the core question, thus, becomes:
where do the legal fiction of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.—seemingly innocently,
as if a mere formality, and ephemerally created and existing under
Delaware corporate law42—and the economic reality of Wal-Mart’s global
40. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 352 (arguing that large public corporations were
competing with and threatening to supplant the modern state as the dominant form of social
organization because of their “concentration of power in the economic field comparable to the
concentration of religious power in the mediaeval church or of political power in the national
state”).
41. Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra note 3, at 604 n.21. See also Gilson,
Separation and Function, supra note 6 (pointing out that “markets encourage a management and
governance structure that fits the corporation’s business” and that “[c]orporate law has nothing to
add to the process”); Friedman, Social Responsibility, supra note 6 (arguing that “the doctrine of
‘social responsibility’ involves the acceptance of the socialist view that political mechanisms, not
market mechanisms, are the appropriate way to determine the allocation of scarce resources to
alternative uses”). Cf. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What is Corporate Law?, in THE
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1, 18 (Reinier
Kraakman et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter Hansmann & Kraakman, What is Corporate Law?] (“As a
normative matter, the overall objective of corporate law—as of any branch of law—is presumably
to serve the interest of society as a whole.”); Mitchell, Trust and Team Production, supra note 12,
at 870 (describing the understanding of corporate organization in terms of team production not
only as a “tale . . . of economics alone” but also as “to conceive of the corporation as a political
institution” and “as a social institution”); Randall S. Thomas, What is Corporate Law’s Place in
Promoting Societal Welfare?: An Essay in Honor of Professor William Klein, 2 BERKELEY BUS.
L.J. 135, 135 (2005) (“It strikes me that the overall goal of good corporate law should be to assist
private parties to create wealth for themselves and the economy in a manner that does not inflict
uncompensated negative externalities upon third parties.”); Steven M.H. Wallman, Understanding
the Purpose of a Corporation: An Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 807, 809–10 (1999) [hereinafter
Wallman, Purpose of a Corporation] (concluding that corporate governance must be aimed at
maximizing “societal wealth over the long term”). To me, it is not clear what should be “ugly”
about this problem, other than that it perhaps taints the (perceived or aspired) purity and sanctity
of corporate theoretical models. I would simply argue that a pure (i.e., non-normative) corporate
law (or any law for that matter) does not—and, because it is a complete human fiction anyhow,
logically cannot—exist. The perceived ‘ugliness’ may, therefore, have more to do with personal
attitudes and preferences (and I mean this only descriptively); some observers simply may “get
real ‘squirrelly,’” Lawrence Raful, What Balance in Legal Education Means to Me: A Dissenting
View, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 135, 135 (2010), when they hear what must sound to them as being
“diffuse” and “confusing” at best, cf. Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust and Economic
Organization, 36 J.L. & ECON. 453, 469 (1993), or as being “new age stuff” at worst, cf. Raful,
supra. See also Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainability, Distribution, and the Macroeconomic Analysis
of Law, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1, 22 (2001) (“More than one commentator has speculated that the
disappearance of limits in macroeconomics serves as a theoretical expedient to avoid difficult
questions of distribution.”); Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About Shareholder
Primacy, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 533, 575 (2006) (“The terms ‘morality’ and ‘justice’ may raise red
flags for readers skeptical of deontology and inclined toward consequentialism.”); Lawrence E.
Mitchell, Understanding Norms, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 177, 203 (1999) (“Norms are fuzzy because
people are fuzzy and life is fuzzy.”) (footnote omitted); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and
Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1699 (1996) (“Norms are fuzzy.”).
42. The legal fiction of a corporation in corporate law (whether in Delaware as in the case of
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. or in other jurisdictions within the United States and internationally) is
created and governed by three discrete categories or sources of law: (i) the ‘internal’ law of the
corporation itself set forth in its so-called constituent or charter documents (certificate or articles
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productive empire intersect (if not, collide)? And the answer may be: within
what can be described as the dichotomous dimensions of corporate legal
theory.43 These dichotomies provide American corporate law with a
principal range of ultimately dialectic jurisprudential foundations which
collectively translate the real world of Wal-Mart’s business enterprise into
what appears to be a rather simple and straight-forward legal construct—
namely, the corporate legal entity.
This construct—as most everything else in American private law—is
based on the acquired interest preferences of a libertarian, free-enterpriseoriented society.44 It has evolved over time—as has arguably all of
corporate law (often guided, even if unaware, by principles of transaction
cost economics)45—in order to provide cost-efficient ‘prefab,’ ‘off-therack’46 governance mechanisms designed to standardize the regulation and
of incorporation and by-laws); (ii) the applicable corporate code in the corporation’s jurisdiction
of incorporation; and (iii) the corporate case law and legal precedents in the corporation’s
jurisdiction of incorporation that either deal with the interpretation and application of the relevant
internal law and/or corporate code provisions or otherwise supplement those provisions in the
absence of any internal law or code guidance. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra
note 4, at 7 n.1; Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, supra note 14, at 5.
43. Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5, at 1403–04 (pointing out the dichotomy
between a positivistic, utilitarian, rules-bound worldview of corporate law and a flexible,
moralistic, standard-based one); Millon, supra note 4, at 201 (describing three
dimensions/dichotomies as relevant to theories of the corporation: (i) corporation as an entity
versus corporation as an aggregation of individuals without separate existence; (ii) corporation as
an “artificial creation of state law” versus “corporation as a natural product of private initiative”;
and (iii) corporate law as a subject of public interest concerns versus corporate law governing
solely the private relations between owners and managers).
44. Cf. O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation, supra note 4. The classical and then
neoclassical economic position is that the political, economic, and legal systems need to provide
(i) strong legal protection of the entrepreneur’s property right to own and control productive
assets, as well as (ii) strict limits on the power of state actors to regulate and control economic
activity. Cf. Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 141, 159–60
(1988).
45. The field of transaction cost economics (TCE), a part of new institutional economics
(NIE), was developed by Oliver Williamson (who also coined the term ‘new institutional
economics’). See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS]; OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS,
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985); Oliver E. Williamson, Introduction, in THE
NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 3 (Oliver E. Williamson &
Sidney G. Winter eds., 1991); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The
Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979); Oliver E. Williamson,
Transaction Cost Economics Meets Posnerian Law and Economics, 149 J. INST. & THEORETICAL
ECON. 99 (1993); Oliver E. Williamson, Why Law, Economics, and Organization?, in THE
ORIGINS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: ESSAYS BY THE FOUNDING FATHERS (Francesco Parisi &
Charles K. Rowley eds., 2005). See also Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5, at
1399; Rudolf Richter, The New Institutional Economics: Its Start, Its Meaning, Its Prospects, 6
EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 161, 163–65, 174–75 (2005) (discussing the development of NIE by
Oliver Williamson).
46. COX & HAZEN, supra note 4, at 42; Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5;
Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 559; Michael Klausner, The Contractarian
Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 783 (2006).
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solution of irreducible interest conflicts which define the corporate
endeavor,47 in particular, in its publicly held variant with widely-dispersed
shareownership and an almost complete separation of ownership and
control.48
In its continued evolution, the construct of the Berle-Means
corporation—both as a legal entity and as an economic concentration of
productive resources in the form of specific investments of dozens of
different firm constituencies—is a priori forced to navigate among, and
wrestle with, irradicable and irreducible dialectic dichotomies. Those
include—a minore ad majus:


the fundamental agency problem of managerial primacy (the
allocation of control with, and the resultant discretion of,
corporate decisionmakers) and shareholder/stakeholder primacy
(the allocation of controlling property and/or contract rights with,
and the resultant accountability to, specific firm participants);49

47. Cf. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 3–4; COX & HAZEN, supra note 4;
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in THE ANATOMY
OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 21, 22 (Reinier Kraakman
et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter Hansmann & Kraakman, Agency Problems].
48. See Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 923
(1984) [hereinafter Romano, Metapolitics]. See also BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note
4, at 3–4 (“The conflicts of interest created by [the] separation of ownership and control drive
much of corporate law . . . .”); BAINBRIDGE, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 6
(discussing the effects of the separation of ownership and control under the heading “The Central
Problem of Corporate Governance”); Alces, supra note 4, at 787 (describing the separation of
ownership and control and the resultant agency cost problem as “a central concern of the law of
corporate governance”); O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation, supra note 4 (stating that
the “central problem of the modern corporation” is found in its “separation of ownership and
control”); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN.
737, 740 (1997) (“The essence of the agency problem is the separation of management and
finance, or—in more standard terminology—of ownership and control.”). The separation of
ownership and control as the defining, characteristic notion of (most) public corporations was first
thoroughly described by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4. But see
KNIGHT, supra note 4 (“The typical form of business unit in the modern world is the corporation.
Its most important characteristic is the combination of diffused ownership with concentrated
control.”). See also BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4; COX & HAZEN, supra note 4;
Bratton, Century’s Turn, supra note 4; Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 4; Millon, supra
note 4; O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation, supra note 4.
49. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 207 (2002)
(“Establishing the proper mix of discretion and accountability . . . emerges as the central corporate
governance question.”) [hereinafter BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS]; Stephen
M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 84
(2004) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Abstention Doctrine]; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Team
Production in Business Organizations: An Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 743, 743 (1999)
[hereinafter Blair & Stout, Team Production] (describing the agency cost problem of monitoring
managers and motivating them to act as faithful agents as “the central economic problem to be
faced in a public corporation” for those following the principal-agent model of the firm); Dooley,
supra note 11, at 524–25; Darian M. Ibrahim, Individual or Collective Liability for Corporate
Directors?, 93 IOWA L. REV. 929, 947–48 (2008); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust. Contract.
Process., in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 185, 188–89 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995)
[hereinafter Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process.]; Pinto, supra note 4, at 266; Larry E. Ribstein,
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shareholder wealth (maximum market value) and stakeholder
welfare (maximum societal value);50



market and hierarchy;51



Aristotelean notions of rectification (corrective justice) and
fairness (distributive justice);52



market liberalism (private liberty) and utilitarianism (social
utility);53 and



the dialectics between the private/internal/market and the
public/external/regulatory spheres of institutional power over the
governance of the corporation (market and polity).54
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The first two dichotomies are what can be termed ‘microdichotomies’
because they inhere in corporate law and corporate law only. In contrast
thereto, the remaining four dichotomies can be described as
‘macrodichotomies.’ They are present in all areas of private law, including
corporate law.55
In what aims to be an essentially descriptive (i.e., positive rather than
normative) account, Part II.A. of this Article will trace the first two dialectic
Why Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 198 (2004) [hereinafter Ribstein, Why
Corporations?]; Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 48, at 742–44.
50. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation,
14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 264–65 (1992) [hereinafter Allen, Schizophrenic Conception]; Jill E.
Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L.
637, 639–40 (2006); Gilson, Separation and Function, supra note 6, at 143 (stating that “the
criteria for good corporate law are limited to a single overriding goal: facilitating the
maximization of shareholder wealth”); Hansmann & Kraakman, What is Corporate Law?, supra
note 41; Mitchell, Trust and Team Production, supra note 12, at 870; Thomas, supra note 41;
Wallman, Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 41. See also Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s
Treatise, supra note 3, at 599 (describing as a critical fact for the intellectual vigor of corporate
law that “all of the interesting and challenging issues involve the resolution of conflicts between
corporate participants”).
51. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS, supra note 45; Oliver
E. Williamson, The Logic of Economic Organization, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 65, 73 (1988) (arguing
that is “necessary to identify and describe the principal governance structures—firms, market,
hybrid modes—to which transactions might feasibly be assigned”). See also Meurer, supra note 9,
at 729–30; Powell, supra note 8, at 297; Rock & Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power, supra note
8, at 1631; Baudry & Gindis, supra note 32, at 1.
52. See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of
Accidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 194–95 (2000); Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice in a
Nutshell, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 349, 349 (2002); Ernest J. Weinrib, Liberty, Community, and
Corrective Justice, 1 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 3, 4–5 (1988); Richard W. Wright, The
Principles of Justice, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1859, 1868, 1889–92 (2000).
53. See, e.g., Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5, at 1396; Romano, Metapolitics,
supra note 48, at 926.
54. See, e.g., Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 549; Bratton, Century’s Turn,
supra note 4, at 760–61; Millon, supra note 4, at 202; Richter, supra note 45, at 177 (describing
Douglass North’s concept of new institutional economics of history as aiming “at a general theory
of the interaction between polity and economy”).
55. More precisely, the third dichotomy, market and hierarchy, is a hybrid realm in that it
evidences both micro- and macrodichotomous characteristics.
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dichotomies: discretion vs. accountability,56 and market value vs. societal
value.57 Both, as microdichotomies, fundamentally inform current corporate
theory (and, thus, the genius of American corporate law). They represent
the main, overarching focal points of corporate governance—as well as of
most of today’s debate in corporate legal theory. Both correspond with
attempts to answer two deceptively simple, but fundamentally elusive and,
therefore, at least partially unanswered questions of corporate governance
(the first such question is, in essence, a procedural and positive question;
the second a substantive and normative one):58
1.“Who Control(s)?”; and
2.“Whose Interest(s) Control(s)?”.

We have come a long way since the time that the governance and inner
workings of corporate entities were regarded as a kind of ‘black box’ (in the
sense of observable inputs, ‘hidden inner magic,’ observable outputs, and
end of story).59 We have also come a long way since the thrust of corporate
law has been equated to “towering skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally
welded together and containing nothing but wind.”60 We have come to
56. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
57. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
58. See BAINBRIDGE, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 10; Bainbridge, The Means
and Ends, supra note 3, at 549–50 (asking “(1) as to the means of corporate governance, who
holds ultimate decisionmaking power? and (2) as to the ends of corporate governance, whose
interests should prevail?”). See also CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 13, at 690 (“Who
decides how the corporation’s general purpose is to be accomplished?”); Margaret M. Blair &
Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board, 79
WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 408 (2001) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, Director Accountability] (asking “(1)
what the law requires of directors, (2) whose interests boards should serve, and (3) how boards
actually work”).
59. Cf. Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5, at 1398 (stating that, until recently,
“the internal operation of corporate actors was no more interesting than the internal operation of
human actors”); Meurer, supra note 9, at 729–30 (describing the original theories of Coase and
Williamson as treating the firm “like a black box in which authority avoids transaction costs” and
concluding that “[m]odern research on the firm opens up the black box and gives a better account
of how firms are organized and the costs and benefits of firm governance”); O’Kelley, Theory of
the Modern Corporation, supra note 4, at 757 (stating that the firm is a ‘black box’ in classical
and neoclassical perfect competition theory); Powell, supra note 8, at 296 (describing the
paradigm shift developed by Ronald Coase in 1937, conceiving of the firm as a governing
structure, thus, “breaking with orthodox accounts of the firm as a ‘black box’ production
function”); Stone, supra note 17, at 8 (claiming that regulatory enforcement intervention imposes
direct and selective constraints on how investors and managers work out various internal firm
relationships and the ‘black box’ prerogative of the enterprise’s interior is, thus, overcome).
60. Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72
YALE L.J. 223, 245 n.37 (1962). See also Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in
Corporate Theory, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2006) (stating that corporate law scholarship was
“[v]irtually nontheoretical until the mid-1970s”); O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation,
supra note 4, at 763 (stating that after the Berle-Means era, “corporation law scholarship, if not
‘dead,’ was certainly viewed as an intellectual backwater”); Romano, Metapolitics, supra note 48
(confirming that “[u]ntil recently, corporate law has been an uninspiring field for research even to
some of its most astute students.”).
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regard and explore—as the central objective function of corporate law61—
its need to provide an efficient governance system for the internal
functionality of the incorporated firm which allows such firm to survive and
prosper (i.e., the formerly ‘hidden inner magic’).62
For the firm to be able to do just that (i.e., to survive and prosper), the
corporate governance system must: (i) allocate authority for making
adaptive decisions on behalf of the firm within some (core) group of
decisionmakers (thus, answering the question “Who Control(s)?”);63 and (ii)
if at all possible, define the norms and interests that should guide such
internal decisionmakers in their decisionmaking (thus, solving the question
“Whose Interest(s) Control(s)?”).64
In order for the firm to be able to do so efficaciously65 and with
continued success of adaptation, survival, and prosperity (in other words, in
order to assure firm sustainability), the corporate governance system must
provide a framework that allows the firm to unceasingly strive to achieve an
optimal dynamic equilibrium66—both: (a) among competing interests of
firm participants (for example, shareholders, directors, managers,
employees, unions, customers, financial creditors, suppliers, etc.)—again, if
such balancing is possible (and, in particular, ex ante predictable);67 and (b)
between discretion and accountability of firm management (i.e., the
decisionmakers).68 Put differently, the corporate governance system needs

61. Cf. Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra note 3, at 611.
62. Cf. Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 552; Rock & Wachter, Islands of
Conscious Power, supra note 8, at 1622.
63. Cf. Dooley, supra note 11, at 466; Susanna K. Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A
Multi-Dimensional Approach to the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN.
L. 97, 127–28 (2009) (discussing the treatment of the corporation’s internal decision structure
(CID Structure) as developed by philosopher Peter French in PETER A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE
AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY ch. 4 (1984) and Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral
Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207, 211 (1979)).
64. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 10, 21; CLARK,
CORPORATE LAW, supra note 13, at 690; Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5;
Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 552; Dooley, supra note 11, at 466. See also
Rock & Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power, supra note 8 (explaining that a “theory of the firm
can also help us figure out . . . the role the law plays in facilitating or interfering with solutions
[among firm participants]”).
65. Regarding my preference for the term ‘efficaciousness’ over ‘efficiency’ in this context,
which captures the idea of a corporate governance structure that has the power to produce
efficiencies over time and under ever-changing circumstances, see Richter, supra note 45, at 175.
66. Cf. Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra note 3, at 599 (describing the interactions
of firm participants “in equilibirium” within the corporate firm which involves the ongoing
“resolution of conflicts between corporate participants”); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic
Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of
Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 27 (1991).
67. Cf. Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra note 3, at 599.
68. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. See also KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF
ORGANIZATION 78 (1974) [hereinafter ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION] (“If every
decision of A is to be reviewed by B, then all we have really is a shift in the locus of authority
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to balance and reconcile (i) the need to protect each group of firm
participants from potential downside risks created by opportunistic behavior
of other groups of firm participants,69 and (ii) the need to encourage firm
managers to act as entrepreneurs and to incur operational risks in order to
increase firm value outputs. It is in this regard that we are talking about the
central agency (cost) problem of the modern public corporation as the
logical result of its separation of ownership and control.70 But the problem
(and the academic inquiry into such problem), by necessity, has been
broadening for a long time.71 Corporate decisionmakers must be seen, at
least functionally, as economic agents aiming (and maybe even charged) to
serve and benefit the welfare of all of the firm’s participants, not only its
shareholders.72
My first conclusion—developed in Part II of this Article—to the two
fundamental questions of “Who Control(s)?” and “Whose Interest(s)
Control(s)?” is that, for the former question, we have arrived at a fairly

from A to B and hence no solution to the original problem.”); BAINBRIDGE, THEORY AND
PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 11.
Neither discretion nor accountability can be ignored because both promote values
essential to the survival of business organizations. Unfortunately, they are ultimately
antithetical: one cannot have more of one without also having less of the other. At some
point, directors cannot be made more accountable without undermining their
discretionary authority.
Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 573 (footnote omitted); Dooley, supra note 11,
at 470.
69. See Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49, at 746.
70. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 3–4; id. at 75 (“Much of
corporate law is best understood as a mechanism for containing . . . agency costs.”); COX &
HAZEN, supra note 4; Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn
A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA.
L. REV. 1735, 1807 (2001) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, Trust]; Phillip I. Blumberg, Corporate
Responsibility and the Social Crisis, 50 B.U. L. REV. 157, 177 (1970); Hansmann & Kraakman,
Agency Problems, supra note 47; Millon, supra note 4, at 221; Marcel Kahan, The Limited
Significance of Norms for Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1877–78 (2001);
O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation, supra note 4; Rock & Wachter, Islands of
Conscious Power, supra note 8, at 1624; Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 48, at 740–48 (discussing
the agency problem as the central problem of corporate governance). See also Richter, supra note
45, at 179 (stating that the central problem of Williamsonian transaction cost economics is ex-post
opportunism).
71. The problem, arguably, has been broadening since Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means
published THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY in 1932. Cf. BAINBRIDGE,
THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 4–5 (describing Berle and Means’ treatise as “what still
may be the most influential book ever written about corporations”); Romano, Metapolitics, supra
note 48, at 923 (describing the same as the “last major work of original scholarship”).
72. See, e.g., Gilson, Separation and Function, supra note 6, at 146 (observing that “one
cannot run a successful business without taking seriously the role of non-shareholders whose
contributions are important to the corporation’s success”); Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise,
supra note 3, at 604 n.21 (acknowledging that distributional/allocational concerns are underlying
central board functions, at least within the Blair/Stout Team Production Model discussed infra).
See also supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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good idea of an answer in the form of partially overlapping73 director
primacy models developed by Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout74 on the one
hand, and Stephen Bainbridge75 on the other. It seems evident from those
director primacy models that the maxim of corporate law with regard to the
first (procedural) question of corporate governance is to establish
centralized, autocratic decisionmaking within the corporate structure.76
Indeed, corporate law squarely situates the board of directors at the very top
of a hierarchical, centralist command-and-control structure that controls the
corporate business and affairs.77 However, when we approach the second
73. Professor Bainbridge acknowledges that his director primacy model partially overlaps with
the Blair/Stout Team Production Model when he states that such “team production model
somewhat resembl[es] director primacy, but also differ[s] from director primacy in key respects.”
Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 551.
74. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout,
Specific Investment and Corporate Law, 7 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 473 (2006) [hereinafter Blair
& Stout, Specific Investment]; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investment:
Explaining Anomalies in Corporate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 719 (2006) [hereinafter Blair & Stout,
Explaining Anomalies in Corporate Law]; Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49;
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L.
REV. 247 (1999) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, Corporate Law]; Blair & Stout, Trust, supra note 70,
at 1735. See generally Stephanie Ben-Ishai, A Team Production Theory of Canadian Corporate
Law, 44 ALBERTA L. REV. 299 (2006); Allen Kaufman & Ernie Englander, A Team Production
Model of Corporate Governance, ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE, Aug. 2005, at 9; Lynn M. LoPucki,
A Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization, 57 VAND. L. REV. 741, 743 (2004);
Alan J. Meese, Essay, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A Critical Assessment, 43
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629 (2002); Mitchell, Trust and Team Production, supra note 12; D.
Gordon Smith, Team Production in Venture Capital Investing, 24 J. CORP. L. 949 (1999). See
infra Part II.A.3 (discussing the Blair/Stout team production model).
75. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 49; BAINBRIDGE,
THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 2; Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus
of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts]; Bainbridge,
Abstention Doctrine, supra note 49; Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder
Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601 (2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Limited Shareholder Voting
Rights]; Bainbridge, Just Say No, supra note 7; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and
Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge,
Shareholder Disempowerment]; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate
Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791 (2002) [hereinafter Bainbridge,
Corporate Takeovers]; Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3; Bainbridge, Convergence
Debate, supra note 2; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Much Ado About Little? Directors’ Fiduciary
Duties in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 335 (2007) [hereinafter Bainbridge,
Much Ado About Little]; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate
Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769 (2006); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group
Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Bainbridge,
Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance]. See also Ribstein, Why Corporations?, supra
note 49, at 196–98. See generally Brett H. McDonnell, Professor Bainbridge and the Arrowian
Moment: A Review of The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice, 34 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 139 (2009). See infra Part II.A.4 (discussing the Bainbridge director primacy model).
76. Cf. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 13, at 21; Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical
and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89, 95 (2004)
[hereinafter Gevurtz, Origins of the Corporate Board]; O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern
Corporation, supra note 4, at 756.
77. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a) (West 2010) (“The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
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(substantive) question of corporate governance, my views move into starker
contrast with the two director primacy models as currently developed. The
Blair/Stout team production model78 insists that the board of directors
remains somehow accountable to the productive team and all of its
participants—namely as a ‘trustee’ and ‘fiduciary’ to whom team members
have ceded control.79 The Bainbridge director primacy model assumes that
the same shareholder wealth maximization principle employed in
shareholder primacy models80 must remain the fundamental norm in order
directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of
incorporation.”); REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (1984) (“All corporate powers shall be
exercised by or under the authority of the board of directors of the corporation, and the business
and affairs of the corporation managed by or under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of
its board of directors . . . .”); BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 3, 72, 74 (“[T]he
board is at the apex of the corporate hierarchy . . . .”); COX & HAZEN, supra note 4, at 149 (“A
corporation’s board of directors is legally the supreme authority in matters of the corporation’s
regular business management.”) (footnote omitted); Gevurtz, Origins of the Corporate Board,
supra note 76, at 92–94; Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives of the Corporate Directors (Or,
Why You Don’t Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 2
(2003) [hereinafter Stout, Proper Motives].
It should be noted that, in practice, most operational decisions—both day-to-day decisions
as well as many long-term policy decisions—are taken by corporate officers and other seniormanagement employees of the corporation pursuant to authority delegated by the board of
directors. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 73, 89; COX & HAZEN, supra
note 4, at 136. Often, the corporation’s chief executive officer (CEO) must be seen as the principal
decisionmaker of the corporation. See O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation, supra note 4,
at 756. The absolute director primacy model developed in this Article includes all decisionmakers,
including all officers of the corporation as well as its senior management employees, whose
decisionmaking authority is derivative from the original and sui generis decisionmaking power
granted to the board of directors by state corporation statutes. Such inclusive treatment of officers
and senior management employees correlates with the legal constraints established by corporate
law for purposes of director accountability, namely fiduciary duties, which are also applied by
state corporation statutes to corporate officers, and by agency law rules to senior management
employees, in a similar fashion. Finally, under the preferred board model in the United States, it is
also of significance in this regard that the CEO regularly functions in a dual capacity: both as the
most senior officer of the corporation and as the chairman of the corporation’s board of directors.
Thus, the CEO—and often many other senior officers of the corporation—is a (inside) board
director in the first place. Notwithstanding this proliferation and delegation of corporate
decisionmaking power, it has been said that “[i]n today’s business environment, the buck
ultimately stops in the boardroom, not the corner office.” Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 77, at
3. Accordingly, I feel justified to commingle the director and officer/management spheres of
decisionmaking and, therefore, to solely focus on director decisionmaking behavior for purposes
of this Article. See Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 4, at 299 n.2.
78. The Blair/Stout team production model can be seen as a progeny of the seminal article by
Michael Jensen and William Meckling in 1976 that “accelerated the deconstruction of the
corporation.” Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra note 3, at 599; Jensen & Meckling,
supra note 17, at 305.
79. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 425 (fiduciary); Blair & Stout,
Corporate Law, supra note 74, at 291 (“In the eyes of the law, corporate directors are a unique
form of fiduciary who, to the extent they resemble any other form, perhaps most closely resemble
trustees.”) (footnote omitted); Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49, at 746 (trustee). See
also Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE
L.J. 879, 880 (stating that “directors occupy a trustee-like position”).
80. See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the shareholder primacy model).
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to guide—and to constrain where necessary—the ultimate decisionmaker
(i.e., the board of directors).81
I am convinced otherwise. My second conclusion, developed in Part II
of this Article, therefore posits that a satisfactory answer to the second,
substantive question of corporate governance (“Whose Interest(s)
Control(s)?”) remains indeterminable within current models of corporate
theory—in particular when today’s variant theoretical constructs of the
corporate form are ‘marred’ with a realistic and pragmatic82 (i.e., not
aspirationally or doctrinally oriented) analysis of American corporate law as
it is currently ‘on the books.’83 In my view, nothing within corporate law—
whether conceptualized and phrased as property rights or as ‘contractual’84
interests—seems to achieve a meaningful modicum of predictive ability85
for decisionmaker behavior ex ante and, thus, inherent therein,
81. Bainbridge, Convergence Debate, supra note 2, at 48; Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts,
supra note 75; Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 551, 592; Bainbridge,
Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 75. See also O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern
Corporation, supra note 4, at 756 n.19.
82. It has been stated in a somewhat different context that “[c]orporate law at its heart is an
exercise in pragmatism, . . . a device not a model.” Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra
note 3, at 600. It should be noted, however, that most devices are usually designed and built after
some modeling.
83. Cf. Wallman, Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 41, at 809, 813–14.
84. The nexus-of-contracts (or contractarian) theory of the firm developed by economists, see
infra Part II.A.2, uses the words ‘contract’ and ‘contractual’ in a broader sense to include “nonconsensual rational economic relationships” that are premised on implicit, self-governing
arrangements between firm participants which do not constitute actual contracts in the legal sense.
See, e.g., HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 24, at 330; Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts, supra note
75, at 10–11; Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 822–23; Rock & Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power,
supra note 8, at 1640–41; Rock & Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law, supra note 5, at 1613.
Accordingly, within this Article I indicate such broader contractarian use of the words ‘contract’
and ‘contractual’ by enclosing them in single quotation marks.
85. Predictive ability and accuracy is, of course, the main criterion by which positive
(descriptive) economic models are evaluated. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE
ECONOMICS 11–12 (1953) (“But economic theory must be more than a structure of tautologies if
it is to be able to predict and not merely describe the consequences of action; if it is to be
something different from disguised mathematics.”) (footnote omitted).
Positive economics submits itself to the rigor of scientific method. Submission means
that the model’s value is to be judged not only by its internal consistency and adherence
to accepted principles, but also by its ability to predict the occurrence of events in the
real world. It must be possible to derive from the model behavioral implications, at least
some of which must be empirically falsifiable and therefore testable.
Fred S. McChesney, Book Review Essay, Positive Economics and All That—A Review of the
Economics Structure of Corporate Law by Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 272, 278 (1992) (reviewing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991)); McChesney, The “Trans Union” Case,
supra note 2; O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation, supra note 4, at 755, 757. See also
BAINBRIDGE, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 2–3; Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts,
supra note 75, at 1; Bainbridge, Just Say No, supra note 7; Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Importance
of Being Trusted, 81 B.U. L. REV. 591, 596 (2001) [hereinafter Mitchell, Importance of Being
Trusted].

358

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 5

accountability of decisionmakers ex post. There is no quantum of control in
corporate law which would ensure the general inviolability of any firm
participant interest at any given point in time. Put differently—whether we
like it or not—a disinterested corporate board is uncontrollable in absolute
terms within the law.86
In this regard, the business judgment rule87—applied ex post88—can be
viewed as a decided refusal by corporate law to provide model-immanent
meaning to the second, substantive question of corporate governance.89
Obviously, there are market mechanisms ex post90 that do address agency
86. Cf. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 226 (“In practice, however, cases in
which the business judgment rule does not shield operational decisions from judicial review are so
rare as to amount to little more than aberrations.”); Rock & Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power,
supra note 8, at 1623 (describing the business judgment rule as “assuring that enforcement [of the
duty of care] is almost entirely nonlegal”); Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 77, at 6 (“The
business judgment rule . . . allows a director who makes even a minimal effort to become
‘informed’ to make foolhardy decisions all day long, without fear of liability.”); id. at 7 (“[I]t is
only a slight exaggeration to suggest that a corporate director is statistically more likely to be
attacked by killer bees than she is to have to ever pay damages for breach of the duty of care.”).
87. The business judgment rule—as the central instrument of judicial review of alleged
violations of director fiduciary duties (care, loyalty, obligation of good faith)—operates as a
presumption (whether in the form of a standard of review or in the form of a judicial abstention
doctrine) that “in making a business decision the directors of a corporation have acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests
of the company.” Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). See, e.g., Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (citing Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812); BAINBRIDGE,
CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 109–10; COX & HAZEN, supra note 4, at 184–85; STEPHEN A.
RADIN, 1 THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 11–23
(6th ed. 2009); Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 77, at 6.
88. Cf. Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5, at 1404 (stating that fiduciary duties
tend to be analyzed in a “particularistic ex post style”).
89. Rock & Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power, supra note 8, at 1623 (describing the
business judgment rule as “a jurisdictional rule that facilitates a self governing [norm-based]
relationship by preventing parties from turning to third-party adjudicators” and “assuring that
enforcement [of the duty of care] is almost entirely nonlegal”). See also BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE
LAW, supra note 4, at 110 (concluding that pursuant to the effects of the business judgment rule,
corporate directors are given a “carte blanche to make decisions that might turn out badly, but no
discretion to make selfish decisions.”); Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49, at 746
(stating that, as a matter of law, corporate directors remain “insulated from the direct command
and control of [shareholders] or any other corporate constituents”); Larry E. Ribstein,
Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1470
(2006) [hereinafter Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility]; Stout, Proper Motives, supra
note 77, at 6 (stating that the business judgment rule “allows a director who makes even a minimal
effort to become ‘informed’ to make foolhardy decisions all day long, without fear of liability”).
90. See, e.g., Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 562; Blair & Stout, Explaining
Anomalies in Corporate Law, supra note 74, at 724; Blair & Stout, Corporate Law, supra note 74,
at 252; Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting Accountability
in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105, 119–20 (2006); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and
the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POLITICAL ECON. 110, 112 (1965); Millon, supra note 4,
at 230; Pinto, supra note 4, at 276–79. See generally Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J. Milliken,
Cognition and Corporate Governance: Understanding Boards of Directors as Strategic DecisionMaking Groups, 24 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 489 (1999).
These post-investment, corrective market mechanisms include, for example, (i) the socalled market for corporate control or hostile-takeover market—which, of course, depends on the
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costs in the form of wasteful managerial shirking and/or rent-seeking.91
However, those after-the-fact correctives, in my judgment, do not help in
any way with firm investments to be made confidently ex ante.92 And, from
all we can tell, those investments are made—daily and literally millions of
times over93—and with a good measure of predictive accuracy therefore
allowing investor confidence and economic efficiency ex ante.94

general financial feasibility of corporate mergers and takeovers in a given economy and industry,
see, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 74, (ii) product-market competition,
see, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 75; COX & HAZEN, supra note 4, at 37;
Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6. J.
LEGAL STUD. 251, 289 (1977), (iii) manager-market competition, see, e.g., BAINBRIDGE,
CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 75; COX & HAZEN, supra note 4, at 37, and (iv) shareholder
activism by institutional and other investors with significant enough stockholdings (though there
is much debate about the extent of which the ‘rational apathy phenomenon’ also applies to those
large-scale investors), see, e.g., CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 13, at 390–92; Bernard S.
Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 524–25 (1990); Edward B.
Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J.
445 (1991); Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance
Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 796 (1993); Robert D. Rosenbaum, Foundations of Sand:
The Weak Premises Underlying the Current Push for Proxy Rule Changes, 17 J. CORP. L. 163
(1991). Furthermore, monitoring costs are still high due to the limited transparency provided by
only minimum forward-looking disclosure requirements under current federal securities rules. See,
e.g., Michael R. Siebecker, Trust & Transparency: Promoting Efficient Corporate Disclosure
Through Fiduciary-Based Discourse, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 115, 128–36 (2009). See generally
Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999); Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An
Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493 (2005).
91. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 75; Allen, Contracts and
Communities, supra note 5; Blair & Stout, Explaining Anomolies in Corporate Law, supra note
74, at 763–71; Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49, at 745; Stout, Proper Motives,
supra note 77, at 5.
92. These correctives may help to encourage some normative agenda across the spectrum ex
ante (and, thus, incentivize firm managements across the spectrum to comply with such agenda),
but they do not help the particular investor who ends up with a particular, disincentivized or ‘nonincentivizable’ firm management and who is forced to (financially) suffer through the corrective
mechanism(s) coming to the ‘rescue’ in her particular case in an attempt by the market to
reinforce the normative agenda across the spectrum. In other words, these correctives distribute
highly inefficient monitoring costs asymmetrically. Unless our investor hedges against such
particularized risk by a widely diversified portfolio, why would she confidently invest ex ante?
See Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 795 (2007)
(describing how stock, counter-intuitively, can become an illiquid investment “when exploited
shareholders try to sell en masse”) [hereinafter Stout, Mythical Benefits].
93. For example, the average daily trading volume on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
for NYSE-listed companies in 2009 totaled 7,982,926 trading transactions per diem, comprising
an average of 2,179,775,581 shares traded for a total average consideration of $46,670,638,331.
Daily NYSE Group Volume in NYSE Listed, 2009, NYSE FACT BOOK ONLINE,
http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer_edition.asp?mode=table&key=3002&cate
gory=3 (last visited Apr. 14, 2011). See also Blair & Stout, Trust, supra note 70, at 1737.
94. Cf. Bainbridge, Just Say No, supra note 7; Michael B. Dorff, Does One Hand Wash the
Other? Testing the Managerial Power and Optimal Contracting Theories of Executive
Compensation, 30 J. CORP. L. 255, 257 (2005) (“To induce investors to buy stock ex ante,
corporate governance law must be designed to give confidence that managers will seldom cheat
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I believe that an absolute director primacy model as developed herein
provides a clear answer to the procedural question of corporate governance
(“Who Control(s)?”)—even though it is an answer that I suspect we may
not like. At the same time, the absolute director primacy model should also
free us from our fruitless searches for model-immanent (perhaps even lawimmanent) answers to the substantial control question of corporate
governance (“Whose Interest(s) Control(s)?”). In my view and quite
plainly, there has to be ‘something’ else in order to explain the phenomenon
of general investor confidence pre-investment in the face of absent manager
accountability post-investment95—to explain why the genius of American
corporate law, though elitist and autocratic, does not regularly also turn
totalitarian, and why a board of directors, though uncontrollable within
corporate law, does not regularly also turn out-of-control within corporate
reality. In other words: I believe that we have not (yet) solved the second,
substantive question: “Whose Interest(s) Control(s)?”. And I have a strong
intuition that what we are really looking for—the so far elusive ‘something’
else—is not only exogenous96 (i.e., situated outside of current
microtheoretical models of the firm), but is essentially protolegal.97 In this
and that when they do cheat they will generally be detected and punished.”); William Klein,
Criteria for Good Laws of Business Association, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 13, 16 (2005).
95. Cf. Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 77, at 8 (asking why directors “seem to mostly live
up to our trust”); id. at 9 (“Rational investors would never cede control of tens of trillions of
dollars of assets to purely self-interested boards, given the tissue-paper thin protection offered by
the rules of fiduciary duty, and the limits of social sanctions.”).
96. Cf. Oliver Hart, Norms and Theory of the Firm, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1701, 1702 (2001)
[hereinafter Hart, Norms and Theory].
97. Ingredients that are relevant variables in such protolegal context are, for example: trust;
trustworthiness; loyalty; notions of public duty; responsibility; fairness; good faith; sense of
morality; reputation; integrity; confidence. See, e.g., Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra
note 5, at 1402 (trust, loyalty); Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 550–51 n.21
(guardianship, duty); George W. Dent, Jr., Academics in Wonderland: The Team Production and
Director Primacy Models of Corporate Governance, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1213, 1221 (2008) (trust);
Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 4, at 306 (reputation, integrity); Hart, Norms and Theory,
supra note 96 (honesty, trust); id. at 1703 (decency, fairness); id. at 1714 (reputation,
trustworthiness); Mitchell, Trust and Team Production, supra note 12 (trust, loyalty, duty);
O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation, supra note 4, at 767 (integrity); id. at 769
(confidence); Rock & Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law, supra note 5, at 1608 (corporate
culture); id. at 1609 (trust); id. at 1611 (credibility); id. at 1613 (reputation); Smith, supra note 74,
at 969 (firm reputation); Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 77, at 1 (altruism); id. at 7 (reputation);
id. at 8–9 (sense of honor, responsibility, sense of obligation; integrity, trustworthiness); id. at 20
(character). Good faith, loyalty (and, implicitly, trust and trustworthiness), and notions of duty—
as protolegal variables—are obviously all ingredients that have become heavily reflected in
director fiduciary duties, i.e., in legal mandates imposed by corporate law. The law, however, is—
at best—still struggling with these variables. For example, see the recent difficulties encountered
by the Delaware Supreme Court attempting to wrestle down some positive, definitional meaning
of ‘good faith’ in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006), and Stone v.
Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). It is, thus, helpful to remind oneself that, in economic parlance,
protolegal variables may turn out to be “observable, but not verifiable.” See Hart, Norms and
Theory, supra note 96. See also Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 419
n.35; Rock & Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law, supra note 5, at 1617.
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maybe limited but significant regard, it can be said that we are still much
more at the beginning of the history of corporate law than at its end.98
II. MICROTHEORETICAL MODELS OF THE FIRM
Microtheoretical models of the firm focus on the internal cohesion,
adaptability, and survival of the firm as a generator and maximizer of
productive output and economic wealth and, thus, largely ignore
distributive concerns99—namely, whether the externalized costs of
generating and maximizing economic wealth are fairly and effectively
distributed100 and whether the resultant economic wealth itself is fairly and
effectively distributed.101 Firm boundaries are sharp, removing firms from
the larger societal context (including the market) like “islands of planned
co-ordination in a sea of market relations.”102 Corporate control and the
predictability of returns on firm-specific investments are the fundamental
concerns.
Two main and fully interdependent dichotomies are involved and
exhaust the field both theoretically and practically. First, one of the
fundamental agency (cost) problems of corporate law103 raises its head:
“Who Control(s)?”. As has been discussed above, theory and practice here
oscillate between manager primacy (i.e., the allocation of control with, and
the resultant discretion of, corporate decisionmakers)104 and investor
primacy (i.e., the allocation of controlling property and/or ‘contract’ rights
98. See Hansmann & Kraakman, The End of History, supra note 2. See also Henry Hansmann,
How Close is the End of History?, 31 J. CORP. L. 745 (2006); Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or
the Law of Business?: Stakeholders and Corporate Governance at the End of History, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 132–33 (2004).
99. Cf. Hansmann & Kraakman, What is Corporate Law?, supra note 41; Mitchell, Trust and
Team Production, supra note 12, at 870; Romano, Metapolitics, supra note 48, at 924; Wallman,
Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 41. See Garrett, supra note 14, at 137 (stating that the
“nexus of contracts theory provides a basis for the director primacy theory and the shareholder
primacy theory, both of which explain the balance of power within the corporation, rather than the
role of corporations as participants in broader governance processes such as foreign relations,
adjudication, and law making”).
100. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 824; Lee, supra note 41, at 538–39; Sheehy, supra
note 15, at 3, 17–20. See also Thomas, supra note 41.
101. Cf. Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5, at 1396 (discussing how the
distribution of gains and losses is “a secondary concern” in the classical liberal economic model);
Millon, supra note 4, at 201–02 (discussing the dichotomy between corporate law’s “external
perspective, paying explicit regard to the relations between the corporation and the rest of society”
on the one hand and “corporate law’s focus as internal, dealing primarily with the governance
problems that arise inside the corporation” on the other hand).
102. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
104. It should be noted that the concept of ‘manager primacy’ is used here in a broader sense to
include, most prominently, the board of directors. See discussion supra note 77. I do not mean to
refer to managerialist models of the firm which were prevalent until the 1970s and 1980s. See,
e.g., William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Corporate
Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619, 690 (2006); Hansmann & Kraakman, The End of
History, supra note 2, at 444; Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 77, at 2–3.
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with, and the resultant accountability to, firm participants making specific
investments into the corporate venture).105 Second, we have come to
understand that this first dichotomy is strongly interdependent with a
second inquiry: “Whose Interest(s) Control(s)?”. Here, corporate practice
and theory have developed a second dichotomy between shareholder/owner
income (i.e., the goal of the corporate endeavor is to achieve maximum
market value and, thus, is aimed at maximizing shareholder wealth at all
cost) and stakeholder welfare (i.e., the goal of the firm is to achieve
maximum societal value and, thus, is aimed at optimizing the respective
distributive values of all firm participants and third parties involved by
allocating resources and externalizing costs as fairly/efficiently as
possible).106
A. PLOTTING MODELS WITHIN MICRODICHOTOMIES
Much of the basic modeling work has, of course, already been done by
others. In his 2003 article on Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance,107 Stephen Bainbridge has also already developed
the basic graphic framework for plotting the two microdichotomies of
corporate law that are of interest here—namely the allocation of corporate
decisionmaking power and the distribution of corporate value-creation
benefits (as well as, inescapably, of value-creation costs).108 As far as I can
tell, however, no one has used this graphic framework in order to also plot
current microtheoretical models of the firm more systematically and in
depth. Table 1 and the discussion that follows in this Part II.A. attempts
such plotting task.

105. It should be noted that interest asymmetries not only exist among various constituencies of
firm participants (e.g., shareholders) but also within the same constituency of firm participants.
Thus, for example, shareholders as a group will be looking at a return on their firm investment
which is functionally discreet and different from other firm participants. But, at the same time,
shareholders among each other will often have very different short-term or long-term targets on
when and how they would like to achieve their individual returns on their respective firm
investments. Similar intra-firm participant interest differentiations, of course, apply to employees,
suppliers, customers, etc.
106. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
107. Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 548. See also BAINBRIDGE,
CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 49; BAINBRIDGE, THEORY AND PRACTICE,
supra note 2; Bainbridge, Abstention Doctrine, supra note 49; Bainbridge, Corporate Takeovers,
supra note 75; Bainbridge, Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, supra note 75;
Bainbridge, Just Say No, supra note 7; Bainbridge, Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, supra note
75; Bainbridge, Much Ado About Little, supra note 75; Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts, supra note
75.
108. Cf. Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra note 3, at 599.
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Figure 1: Plotting Corporate Microdichotomies109
shareholders/corporation

ends axis:
decision-controlling
interests

investor primacy

manager primacy
(discretion)

(accountability)

means axis:
decisionmaking
power

stakeholders/society

polity

market

I II
III IV
(net market value/income)

(net societal value/welfare)

Figure 1 describes the core conceptual framework. Table 1
demonstrates how the four microtheoretical models of the firm which are at
the center of today’s corporate theory debate110 can be plotted within Figure
1 and, therefore, can be juxtaposed and compared to each other.

109. Cf. Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 548. The author has received reprint
permission for the original chart from Northwestern University School of Law, Northwestern
University Law Review, which permission expressly includes the changes that have been made by
the author to the original chart.
110. The main four models in today’s academic discussion can be labeled as ‘shareholder
primacy,’ ‘contractarian,’ ‘team production,’ and ‘director primacy.’ See generally Bainbridge,
Convergence Debate, supra note 2 (discussing shareholder-primacy and director-primacy
models); John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable
Are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837 (1999) (discussing team-production models);
Dent, Jr., supra note 97 (discussing team-production and director-primacy models); Fisch, supra
note 50 (discussing shareholder-primacy models); Lee, supra note 41 (discussing shareholder
primacy and team production models); J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes
Corporate Theory and Practice, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 315–26 (2010) (discussing all four
models as well as “agency theory” and “progressive corporate law theory”). For a more general
discussion of those firm models, see generally Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 819; O’Kelley, Theory
of the Modern Corporation, supra note 4, at 753–77; Wallman, Purpose of a Corporation, supra
note 41.
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Table 1: Current Microtheoretical Models of the Firm
Model
Shareholder
Primacy

“Who Controls?”
board
(by delegation of,
and with
accountability to,
shareholders)

Contractarian ‘nexus’ of explicit
and implicit
‘contracts’
(no individual
group of firm
participants
controls)
Team
board
Production
(as a mediating
hierarch by
delegation of, and
with accountability
to, all firm
participants)
Director
board
Primacy
(as a decisionmaker
by fiat)

“Whose Interest(s)
Control(s)?”
shareholders
(indirectly, all firm
participants exert
some influence
since shareholders
are residual
claimants)
shareholders
(indirectly, all firm
participants exert
some influence
since shareholders
are residual
claimants)
all firm participants
(directly as a team)

Main Locus
in Figure 1
Quadrant II

shareholders
(indirectly, all firm
participants exert
some influence
since shareholders
are residual
claimants)

Quadrant I
(with,
perhaps, a
bit of
Quadrant
II)

Quadrant II
(with,
perhaps, a
bit of
Quadrant
IV)
Quadrants
II & IV

Obviously, there are significant degrees of oversimplification involved
in this plotting exercise but such is inevitable if one tries to gain any
meaningful overview. Models are only as good as the reach of their
conceptual and predictive wherewithal is far.111 They involve (if not,
require) the breaking down of complexity and the reassembly of (complex)
reality in more abstract but, thus, more manageable structural pieces.112 By
necessity, models are different from reality—smaller, simpler, more limited

111. Cf. BAINBRIDGE, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 2–3.
112. See Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts, supra note 75, at 9.
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than reality.113 But they aspire to replicate essential parts of reality, hence,
to make reality explainable and predictable.114 All models discussed here
venture to explain the reality of corporate governance. The (merely)
narrative claims made in this Part II.A. are that: (i) some models are more
accurate than others; and (ii) all models are (necessarily) incomplete in their
attempt to answer the second microdichotomous question, “Whose
Interest(s) Control(s)?”.
1. The Shareholder Primacy Model
Who Controls: Board (by delegation of, and with accountability to,
shareholders as owners of the firm).
Whose Interest(s) Control(s): Shareholders (indirectly, all firm
participants exert some influence since shareholders are residual claimants).
Main Locus: Quadrant II (shareholder interests control; board of
directors/management is fully accountable).
Description. It has been claimed that as a matter of norms, efficiency,
and fact, the world of corporate law converges around the ‘standard’
shareholder-centered model of the business corporation.115 In this model,
shareholder primacy describes and defines the maximization of shareholder
wealth as the objective function, purpose, and controlling interest of the
corporation.116 Thus, the only value we need in order to evaluate the
fairness and efficiency of corporate law is a “uni-criterion”:117 shareholder
gains. Shareholders are the residual owners (claimants) of the firm—they
receive only what is left after every other claimant has been satisfied in
full.118 As ultimate owners of the corporation, the corporation is their

113. Cf. BAINBRIDGE, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 2–3; Bainbridge, Nexus of
Contracts, supra note 75, at 9. In other words, models are constructions, and it is important to
keep in mind that life (i.e., reality) is serial, not constructed.
114. Cf. HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 24, at 331.
115. Hansmann & Kraakman, The End of History, supra note 2, at 440–41. See also Blair &
Stout, Team Production, supra note 49, at 744 (claiming that law professors have come to adopt
the shareholder primacy model as “the dominant paradigm for understanding the modern
corporate enterprise”); Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra note 3, at 601; Millon, supra
note 4, at 224 (stating that “the shareholder primacy principle has been the fundamental postulate
of corporate law”); Wallman, Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 41, at 807.
116. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962) [hereinafter
MILTON, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM]; Bernhard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing
Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1921 (1996) (“The efficiency goal of
maximizing the company’s value to investors [is] . . . the principal function of corporate law.”);
Gilson, Separation and Function, supra note 6, at 143; Friedman, Social Responsibility, supra
note 6. See Allen, Schizophrenic Conception, supra note 50; Fisch, supra note 50.
117. Gilson, Separation and Function, supra note 6, at 143.
118. The equity investors of a firm (i.e., the shareholders in a corporation) are regarded as the
firm’s residual claimants because all debt investors’ claims against the firm, once liquidated, have
to be satisfied first before any remaining (i.e., residual) profits left after the firm’s obligations to
debt investors have been paid may be distributed to the equity investors. In others words,
shareholders are only entitled to the residuum of profits, if any, after everyone else has been paid.
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‘property.’119 Therefore, their collectivized interest in the prosperity and
survival of the firm is congruent and identical with the firm’s interest
overall. Firm value is, ipso facto, shareholder value (and vice versa). In the
words of the late economist and Nobel Laureate, Milton Friedman:
[T]here is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long
as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open
and free competition without deception or fraud.120

As a theoretical construct developed from neoclassical economic
models, the shareholder primacy model carries significant strengths (as well
as popularity among corporate scholars).121 It is logically created from the
unbundling of firm ownership and firm control in the Berle-Means
corporation,122 and neatly divides the playing field into only two groups of
firm participants who matter: those whose interests control the corporate
endeavor—namely, principals/owners/shareholders—and those who are
controlling the decisionmaking within the corporate endeavor on behalf of
principals/owners/shareholders—namely, agents/managers/directors.123
And, over time,124 corporate law seems to have devised the unique
controlling mechanism which binds the latter to the former: fiduciary duties
See, e.g., Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49; Wallman, Purpose of a Corporation,
supra note 41, at 810.
119. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49.
120. MILTON, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, supra note 116. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Davis, Jr.,
Discretion of Corporate Management to Do Good at the Expense of Shareholder Gain—A Survey
of, and Commentary on, the U.S. Corporate Law, 13 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 7, 8 (1988) (“The bedrock
principle of U.S. corporate law remains that maximization of shareholder value is the polestar for
managerial decisionmaking.”); Garrett, supra note 14, at 138 (“The moral imperative for
corporations is to make money. Under this view of the raison d’être for corporations, choosing
socially responsible action over profit maximizing action is immoral.”) (footnotes omitted). See
also Friedman, Social Responsibility, supra note 6.
121. Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49, at 744 (claiming that law professors have
come to adopt the shareholder primacy model as “the dominant paradigm for understanding the
modern corporate enterprise”).
122. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4. But see KNIGHT, supra note 4 (“The typical form of
business unit in the modern world is the corporation. Its most important characteristic is the
combination of diffused ownership with concentrated control.”). See also BAINBRIDGE,
CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4; COX & HAZEN, supra note 4; Bainbridge, Convergence Debate,
supra note 2; Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49; Bratton, Century’s Turn, supra note
4; Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 4; Millon, supra note 4; O’Kelley, Theory of the
Modern Corporation, supra note 4; Pinto, supra note 4.
123. For this reason, the shareholder primacy model is also often called the ‘principal-agent
model’ of the corporation. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49; Gilson &
Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra note 3, at 603. See also Garrett, supra note 14, at 135–36.
124. The dialectic development of fiduciary duties and, thus accountability, of corporate
managers ‘over time’ was at the core of the so-called ‘Berle-Dodd debate’ between Adolf A.
Berle, Jr. and E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. in the wake of the Great Depression. See A. A. Berle, Jr.,
Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931) [hereinafter Berle,
Corporate Powers] (presenting Berle’s thesis that “all powers granted to a corporation or to the
management of a corporation . . . are necessarily and at all times exercisable only for the ratable
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of care and loyalty and the obligation of good faith which together
circumscribe the responsibility of corporate directors to shareholders and
prevent (under normal circumstances) the kind of delicts125 self-interested
or inattentive directors as agents can be expected ex ante to commit without
the existence of such controlling mechanism.126 The fact that fiduciary
duties are only owed to shareholders must mean that shareholder value must
be the ultimate measuring stick of corporate control (at least, in a zero-sum
situation where all other firm inputs are of equal importance/weight).127 The
classic statement in corporate law that appears to bind corporate directors to
shareholders as the corporate constituent with the controlling, overriding
interest is found in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,128 a 1919 Michigan Supreme
Court case cited by proponents of controlling shareholder interests,129

benefit of all the shareholders as their interest appears”); A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate
Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932) [hereinafter Berle, Corporate
Managers] (providing a response to Dodd’s challenge of Berle’s theory); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr.,
For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932) [hereinafter Dodd,
Corporate Managers Trustees] (challenging Berle’s theory); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Is Effective
Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 194
(1935) [hereinafter Dodd, Is Effective Enforcement Practicable?] (providing a response to Berle’s
response). For an overview of the Berle-Dodd debate, see generally Allen, Schizophrenic
Conception, supra note 50, at 265–66; Bratton & Wachter, Corporatist Origins, supra note 4, at
122–34; Fisch, supra note 50, at 646–48; A. A. Sommer, Jr., Whom Should the Corporation
Serve? The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 36–39 (1991);
Joseph L. Weiner, The Berle-Dodd Dialogue on the Concept of the Corporation, 64 COLUM. L.
REV. 1458 (1964). See also Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 77, at 22 (stating that “[t]he debate
between the ‘shareholder primacy’ view and ‘stakeholder’ models of the corporation dates back at
least seventy years, and [that] it remains unresolved today”) (footnote omitted). In an interesting
twist to today’s prevailing views on shareholder primacy, Adolf Berle explicitly conceded defeat
of his shareholder primacy model to Dodd’s stakeholder-oriented model once A.P. Smith
Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953), appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953),
was decided. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169
(1954) [hereinafter BERLE, CAPITALIST REVOLUTION]; Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra
note 3, at 561 n.70.
125. Fiduciary duties are traditionally seen as delictual obligations, i.e., their breach resonates in
tort, not in contract. See, e.g., ENEA v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. App. 4th 1559, 1566–67 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2005) (describing fiduciary duties as “delictual” duties “imposed by law” and that “their
breach sounds in tort”); DeMott, supra note 79, at 887. But see, Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the
Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. CORP. L. 239, 244 (2009) (“All fiduciary relationships are, at
some level, contractual.”); id. at 270–71 (“Even though all fiduciary relationships are contractual,
not all contractual relationships are fiduciary.”).
126. See O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation, supra note 4, at 762; Rock & Wachter,
Islands of Conscious Power, supra note 8, at 1661.
127. Cf. Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra note 3, at 603; John H. Matheson & Brent
A. Olson, Corporate Law and the Longterm Shareholder Model of Corporate Governance, 76
MINN. L. REV. 1313, 1327 (1992).
128. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
129. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 220–21; MARJORIE KELLY,
THE DIVINE RIGHT OF CAPITAL 52–53 (2001); Bainbridge, Convergence Debate, supra note 2, at
46; Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate
Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 601 (1992) [hereinafter Mitchell, A Theoretical and
Practical Framework]; Wallman, Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 41, at 815.
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almost without fail,130 as the ultimate legal tenement of shareholder
primacy:131
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit
of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for
that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of
means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself,
to the reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among
stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.132

Critique. What is centrally problematic about the shareholder primacy
model, in essence, is that it contradicts—in a multitude of aspects—the
reality of American corporate law as it is currently ‘on the books.’133
a. Complete Absence of Explicit Statements of Shareholder
Primacy
As a starting point, state corporation statutes refrain from saying
anything explicit about the purpose of business corporations with regard to
the creation or maximization of either profits in general or shareholder
wealth in particular.134 The same is true with the standard constituent
documents of the corporation (i.e., its certificate, or articles, of
incorporation, and by-laws).135 Such silence on the very topic of
shareholder value which falls most squarely within the ambit of the
shareholder primacy model is perhaps surprising on first blush. However, it
is conceptually necessary and logical. Simply put, there are (too) many
ways to go about increasing (or, more precisely, attempting to increase) the
130. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, supra note 14, at 2 (stating that the
decision is “almost invariably cited” and is “routinely employed as the only legal authority for this
proposition”); Wallman, Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 41, at 815.
131. It is, of course, interesting and important to note—as Lynn Stout recently has, see Stout,
Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, supra note 14—that this statement by the Michigan
Supreme Court (i) is devoid of any reference or citation of applicable precedent in order to support
the statement and, thus, the shareholder primacy model decreed therein, id. at 4–5; see also
Millon, supra note 4, at 223, (ii) is judicial dicta only, Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching
Dodge v. Ford, supra note 14, at 2, 3–4; see also Wallman, Purpose of a Corporation, supra note
41, at 815, and (iii) comes from a marginal jurisdiction as far as American corporate law is
concerned, Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, supra note 14, at 3 (stating that
“Michigan . . . is a distant also-ran in the race between and among the states for influence in
corporate law”).
132. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684. See also Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch.
1986) (“It is the obligation of directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run
interests of the corporation’s stockholders.”).
133. See Wallman, Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 41, at 809, 813–14. See also Blair &
Stout, Team Production, supra note 49, at 744 (describing the principal-agent model as painting
“a potentially misleading portrait of the modern business firm”).
134. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 13, at 678–79. See also Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing
Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 738 (2005) (“Corporate
managers have never had an enforceable legal duty to maximize corporate profits.”); Rock &
Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power, supra note 8, at 1643–44.
135. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, supra note 14, at 5.
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profits for a particular business corporation at any particular point in time in
any future particularized context,136 and the open-ended texture of the
statutes and constituent documents simply reflects and documents such ex
ante indeterminability. At the same time, such open-ended texture also
provides for the necessary decisional flexibility and maneuverability of firm
management in order to take adaptive steps on behalf of the corporation
which will ensure its survival and prosperity and will, thus, ensure
continued firm sustainability.
b. Director Fiduciary Duties Run Primarily to the Corporation,
Not Its Shareholders
Shareholder primacy models assume that fiduciary duties are indeed
owed directly—and exclusively—by corporate directors to the
corporation’s shareholders and that, therefore, corporate directors are,
indeed, immediately responsible to shareholders who only delegated their
own authority to conduct their personal business as principals and owners
of the corporation to corporate directors as their fully accountable agents.137
As far as we can tell, this is not the law anywhere:138 director fiduciary
duties are owed primarily to the corporation as a whole (whether perceived
as a separate entity or a mere aggregation or nexus of firm inputs), not to
shareholders per se.139 In this regard, it can be said that the shareholder
primacy model commits a petitio principii fallacy: the model attempts to
prove shareholder value as the decision-controlling interest by assuming
and emphasizing shareholder-only-owed duties as evidence of ultimate
136. Cf. Gilson, Separation and Function, supra note 6, at 146 (observing that “one cannot run
a successful business without taking seriously the role of non-shareholders whose contributions
are important to the corporation’s success”).
137. See, e.g., Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 4, at 303; Wallman, Purpose of a
Corporation, supra note 41, at 807.
138. Wallman, Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 41, at 813.
139. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989)
(holding that “[i]t is basic to our law that the board of directors . . . owe [sic] fiduciary duties of
care and loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders.”). See also Blair & Stout, Corporate Law,
supra note 74, at 290; Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework, supra note 129, at 630–
40; Stout, Mythical Benefits, supra note 92, at 804; Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 77, at 23;
Wallman, Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 41, at 809, 813–14.
Though it must be noted that no other firm participant has standing in order to sue
corporate directors for breaches of fiduciary duties on behalf of the corporation, thus, claiming
injury to the corporation. This, however, appears to be more a reflection of the institutional
competence of courts (or their lack thereof as well as their unwillingness) to address threats to the
corporation in terms of shareholder interests. The courts’ inquiry remains limited to whether
directors’ actions or inactions were in the best interest of the corporation, not whether
shareholders would be (hypothetically) better off, or the corporation’s share price would be
higher, if certain actions had not been taken or certain inactions had been omitted (for example, if
nightlights had been installed at the baseball stadium, see Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776
(Ill. 1968)). See Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 426–30. The business
judgment rule limits the courts’ institutional competence (or better, willingness and appetite) for
such a broad and open-ended second-guessing inquiry even further. Id.
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shareholder primacy. However, it turns out that shareholder-only-owed
fiduciary duties do not exist in corporate law.140
c. As a Rule, Director Decisionmaking Is Absolute
Even if one were to situate fiduciary duties as running immediately
between corporate directors on the one hand and the shareholders of the
corporation, in aggregate, on the other hand, American corporate law
almost never finds a delictual breach of such fiduciary obligations of
directors.141 The legal standards for duty-compliant director conduct are
extremely low (in the absence of blatant director self-interests that remained
unsanitized at the corporate level),142 while the procedural hurdles that even
a derivative shareholder claim with merit needs to overcome are extremely
high (again, in the absence of blatant director self-interests that remained
unsanitized at the corporate level). These substantive and procedural
corporate law standards combine to make director liability a genuine
rarity143—often even a judicial aberration—rather than a robust tool of
director accountability and, thus, a fair and efficient mechanism of
corporate control.
If the board decision is not inflicted by any non-insulated self-interest
of the acting directors (which board decision corporate law would then
invalidate for breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty),144 virtually
everything—every motive and every end underlying directorial
decisionmaking—can become a permissible purpose in order to justify the
board decision as long as a judicial review within the parameters of the
business judgment rule presumption145 can independently and sua sponte
devise a minimum proper rationale for why the board decision appears to be
made in good faith and in the reasonable belief of having been in the best
interest of the corporation (and, thus, indirectly also in the best interest of
protecting firm wealth maximization goals in the short-146 and/or long-

140. An early conceptualization of this aspect was at the core of the so-called ‘Berle-Dodd
debate’ between Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. in the wake of the Great Depression
and their dialectic development of fiduciary duties and, thus accountability, of corporate
managers. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (West 2010); N.Y. BUS. CORP. Law § 713
(McKinney Supp. 2010).
143. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. See also Stout, Mythical Benefits, supra note 92,
at 798 (“[T]he duty of care (famously hamstrung by the business judgment rule) is far less
effective at preventing director shirking.”).
144. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49, at 746.
145. For an explanation of the business judgment rule, see supra note 87.
146. See, e.g., Kamin v. American Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976), aff’d,
387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (considering the serious short-term effects that a
reduction of net income would have had on the market value of the publicly traded American
Express Company stock).
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term147).148 In other words, within the confines of the business judgment
rule, the board’s decisionmaking is absolute.149 There is no “judicial
backstop”150 (because there is no legal backstop) in order to provide and
enforce director accountability—neither ex ante nor ex post.
d. No Shareholder Participation Rights
In the Berle-Means corporation, shareholders are prevented from any
meaningful active participation in the management of the corporation. They
are neither entrepreneurs nor passive owners with ultimate intervention or
step-in rights who, therefore, in one way or the other would actively
participate in the management of the business and affairs of the corporation.
Widely-dispersed shareownership coupled with relatively small (if not,
minute) holdings of individual shareholders (even in the case of large
institutional shareholders with multi-million-dollar investments) have
transformed legions of shareholders into faceless, passive, and nondominant investors subject to ‘rational apathy,’151 whose respective
investments are entirely controlled by professional managers.152 Investment
entry and investment exit (i.e., what is also known as ‘voting with your
feet’153—namely purchasing more shares when one likes the business
performance of the corporation and disposing stock when one is unhappy
with such performance) are the sole indirect and non-legal participation and
control avenues available. In particular, even though shareholders
technically elect the board of directors, shareholders have no factual control

147. See generally Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. 1968) (considering the long-term
interests of the Chicago Cubs franchise corporation in its property value at Wrigley Field which
might demand all efforts to keep the neighborhood from deteriorating).
148. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); Brehm v. Eisner,
746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000); BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 114.
149. See, e.g., Helfman v. Am. Light & Traction Co., 187 A. 540, 550 (N.J. Ch. 1936) (“In a
purely business corporation . . . the authority of the directors in the conduct of the business of the
corporation must be regarded as absolute when they act within the law, and the court is without
authority to substitute its judgment for that of the directors.”) (emphasis added). See also supra
note 89 and accompanying text.
150. See Rock & Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law, supra note 5, at 1613; id. at 1617 (judicial
safety net); Mitchell, Importance of Being Trusted, supra note 85, at 614 (legal backstop).
151. Bainbridge, Convergence Debate, supra note 2, at 50; Blair & Stout, Director
Accountability, supra note 58, at 433.
152. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49; Millon, supra note 4, at 214–15;
O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation, supra note 4, at 760–61; Stout, Proper Motives,
supra note 77, at 3.
153. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 434. Sometimes also referred to
as ‘voting with your wallet,’ see, e.g., Stout, Mythical Benefits, supra note 92, at 802, as doing the
‘Wall Street walk,’ see, e.g., Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 77, at 3, or as adopting the ‘Wall
Street Rule,’ see, e.g., Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts, supra note 75, at 21.
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(and, arguably, no legal control) over the boardroom setup, over who makes
it onto the board of directors, and who does not.154
There are three main reasons for this often underappreciated
phenomenon. First, during the board nomination process, current directors
will self-nominate as a slate or handpick and nominate a new board
candidate as part of the slate in case a current board member has earlier
resigned or otherwise will no longer be a board member post-election.155 In
this regard, corporate boards of Berle-Means corporations are de facto selfperpetuating.156
Furthermore, board elections occur pursuant to the proxy system
prescribed for the publicly listed corporation by federal law. The proxy
statement published by the corporation and mailed to all of its shareholders
of record will list the self-nominated slate of board candidates for election
(i.e., the current directors and any hand-picked successor)—and no one
else. Any outside (insurgent) board candidate wishing to engage in a proxy
contest has to prepare her own proxy materials at prohibitive production
costs and faces even more prohibitive proxy solicitation costs trying to
reach out to a largely passive shareholder base in an effort to garner support
for herself as an alternative board candidate.157 With shareholders mostly
being rationally apathetic and passive investors who are accustomed to the
absence of any genuine participation rights in the corporation, a proxy
solicitation contest—in the vast majority of cases and as a matter of
routine—results in favor of the corporation and its own proxy request for its
incumbent directors.158 The incumbent directors of the corporation are
simply able to collect enough proxies from shareholders who will not attend
the shareholders meeting at which the board election takes place in person

154. See, e.g., Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS.
LAW. 43, 45–46 (2003); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L.
REV. 675 (2007).
155. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 434.
156. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 87–88. See also BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra
note 4, at 72 (“In practice, of course, even the election of directors (absent a proxy contest) is
predetermined by the existing board nominating the next year’s board.”); id. at 73 (“Although
shareholders . . . retain the right to elect directors, the incumbent board controls the election
process, and thus the firm.”); Dent, Jr., supra note 97, at 1219.
157. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy
Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1071, 1085–87 (1990); Kahan, supra note 70, at
1894; Stout, Mythical Benefits, supra note 92, at 789.
158. See Peter Dodd & Jerold B. Warner, On Corporate Governance: A Study of Proxy
Contests, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 407–11 (1983) (examining a sample of firms experiencing proxy
contests for seats on their board of directors and finding that dissident shareholders usually fail to
obtain a majority of board seats in a given proxy contest); Kahan, supra note 70, 1894; Stout,
Proper Motives, supra note 77, at 3.
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(which is, in almost all cases, a vast majority of shareholders) and, thus, as
proxyholders for such shareholders proceed to re-elect themselves.159
Lastly, most board elections in publicly listed corporations do still
follow the so-called plurality voting system. Unlike a majority voting
system, where ‘yes’ and ‘no’ votes will be cast and counted for each
individual candidate (who would then require a majority of affirmative
votes from all votes cast for her to be elected), the plurality system only
allows shareholders to vote either ‘yes’ or to ‘withhold’ their votes.
Withheld votes are not counted as ‘votes cast.’ Thus, all votes cast that will
remain as ‘votes cast’ after this convenient legal ‘technicality’ is applied are
the ‘yes’ votes.160 As a matter of state corporate law, only ‘votes cast’
determine the outcome of the election. ‘Plurality’ in this context then only
means that those board nominees who accumulate the most ‘yes’ votes for
themselves out of all ‘votes cast’ will be elected. Since in most board
elections the board nominees are nominated as a slate and there is no
competition for open board seats (i.e., there are only as many open board
seats as there are board nominees), every board nominee is guaranteed a
seat and will be elected onto the board as long as she has received one
single ‘yes’ vote out of all ‘votes cast’. And to further ensure that there is at
least one ‘yes’ vote for each board nominee (actually, that there are a lot of
‘yes’ votes for each board candidate), proxy cards are usually set up in a
way that one can only vote ‘yes’ for the entire slate of (self-)nominated
board candidates and can only ‘withhold’ individual votes from particular
board candidates (the latter, of course, are not considered ‘votes cast’).
Thus, as long as one single shareholder is voting ‘yes’ for the entire slate of
board candidates and there is no outside candidate running (which is almost
never the case for the reasons discussed above), everyone has received at
least one ‘yes’ vote and is voted in.
Obviously, this is a far cry from any kind of a democratic election
process.161 It does not mesh well with any notion of genuine shareholder
159. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 277; Blair & Stout, Corporate Law, supra note 74,
at 311 (“[S]hareholders in public corporations do not in any realistic sense elect boards. Rather,
boards elect themselves.”); Stout, Mythical Benefits, supra note 92, at 789.
160. Even totalitarian states holding pro forma elections (for example, those that were held
under communist rule in former Warsaw Pact countries) cannot get away with this—though, I am
sure, their rulers would love to.
161. Cf. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 13, at 95 (describing one typical response by
practitioners and commentators to shareholder voting rights as “the whole institution of
shareholder voting is a fraud, or a mere ceremony designed to give a veneer of legitimacy to
managerial power, and that in a more forthright world the institution would simply be dropped”);
Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 555; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for
Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 849–50 (2005); Daniel J.H. Greenwood,
Markets and Democracy: The Illegitimacy of Corporate Law, 74 UMKC L. REV. 41, 41 (2005)
(stating that “corporate law is chosen by the very corporate managers who ought to be controlled
by it, and created by lawyers, legislatures and judges unanswerable to the people whose lives are
affected by it”). Cf. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985) (citing
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984)) (“If the stockholders are displeased with the
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primacy and majoritarian shareholder control: Shareholders in Berle-Means
corporations do not control who the individual directors are—who, postelection, will go on to control their respective firm investments.162 And they
have no legal means—in the reality of corporate practice—to even replace
directors who act consistently in a manner that disagrees with a majority of
shareholders’ views on how to maximize corporate profits and shareholder
gains.163
e. Directors Are Not Agents
A further critique of the shareholder primacy model is directed at the
fact that the authority of board directors is not derived from (and, therefore,
limited by) any delegating act, any transfer of actual authority by the
shareholders (as principals), to the directors to transact the shareholders’
business on behalf of such shareholders (as agents).164 Rather, all
corporation statutes create and place ultimate authority to run the firm (as
statutory authority or authority as a matter of law)165 squarely—and
exclusively—in the hands of the corporation’s board of directors.166 That
also means that directors are not legal agents—neither of shareholders nor
of the corporation.167 They are sui generis a decisionmaking body (or
organ) of the corporation and are not subject to direct control or supervision
by anyone, including the firm’s shareholders.168 Furthermore, the authority
of corporate directors to direct and control the affairs of the corporation for
action of their elected representatives, the powers of corporate democracy are at their disposal to
turn the board out.”).
162. Cf. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 434 (“The net result is that, as
a practical matter, the casting of shareholder votes in most public corporations is a meaningless
rite.”). The strongest signal that can be sent by shareholders in this regard (other than, of course,
voting with their feet—often, at a significant loss to their return on their investment) is an
accumulation of withheld votes as has happened with Disney’s then CEO, Michael Eisner, in 2004
when Eisner received about 45% withheld votes at the annual shareholder meeting. See Laura M.
Holson, 2 Disney Directors to Withhold Board Votes at Annual Meeting, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9,
2005, at C7.
163. Obviously, those shareholders can (and do) vote with their feet—which normally would
result in a prolonged decrease of the corporation’s share price and which could thereby make the
corporation a takeover target since it seems to be undervalued because of ‘bad’ management,
which in turn, would force the incumbent directors to better manage in the first place and listen
more carefully to disgruntled shareholders. However, this is a market mechanism, not a legal
mechanism of shareholder ‘influence’—it cannot constitute genuine shareholder ‘control’ if one
has to exit one’s investment first (usually, at a loss in value then) in order to bring changes for
which there will be no longer any financial return.
164. Cf. Stout, Mythical Benefits, supra note 92, at 804.
165. Cf. Millon, supra note 4, at 215.
166. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a) (West 2010); REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (1984).
See also CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 13, at 690; HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 24, at
505; Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49, at 746.
167. Cf. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 76; HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note
24, at 506; Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 423; Blair & Stout, Corporate
Law, supra note 74, at 290; Stout, Mythical Benefits, supra note 92, at 804.
168. Blair & Stout, Corporate Law, supra note 74, at 290.

2011]

Deconstructing Corporate Governance

375

and on behalf of the corporation is also original (as opposed to, delegated
and, thus, derivative) and sui generis.169
f. Directors Control Shareholder Return
One area of complete director discretion which is specifically set forth
in state corporation statutes is the declaration of dividends.170 There is no
statutory mandate for declaring dividends and, in today’s world, a board can
refuse any shareholder request for dividend declarations without fear of
liability. There is good reason for such absolute board discretion: In its
absence, opportunistic, predatory and even cannibalistic shareholder wealth
‘maximization’ would be the norm and would ultimately destroy the
corporation rather than allow its continued prosperity and survival. For
example, aggressive speculative shareholders would invest for a powerful
stake, pressure boards into dividend payments in order to milk as much firm
value out of the corporation short-term, leave the corporation with
insufficient financial maneuverability for innovation and adaptation longterm, and then would either dump the stock before it has no value left or
forfeit it entirely and move on to their next target. Their investment strategy
would become a de facto (partial) liquidation strategy. Corporate law
decidedly estopps such opportunistic shareholder behavior by at least
curtailing (if not, not recognizing) shareholder primacy and by creating
absolute director primacy for the declaration of dividends as a matter of
law,171 thereby discouraging intershareholder opportunism.172
g. Charitable Giving
Corporations can make charitable contributions—none of which
directly benefit shareholders (quite the opposite is true: they directly and
adversely affect shareholders as far as their bottomline is concerned) and,
169. Cf. Manson v. Curtis, 119 N.E. 559, 562 (N.Y. 1918); Burrill v. Nahant Bank, 43 Mass.
163, 166–67 (1840); BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 74.
The model behind corporate law’s treatment of authority is one of a unilaterally
controlled flow of authority from a single wellspring of power rather than a bubbling up
and flowing together of many individual sources of personal power. The state has
power; it chooses to delegate it to the board of directors of a corporation.
CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 13, at 22; Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary
Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 56 (John W. Pratt &
Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985) [hereinafter Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties]
(stating that “directors are not agents of the corporation but are sui generis”) (emphasis added);
Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L.
REV. 173, 216 (1985).
170. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 173 (West 2010).
171. Cf. Stout, Mythical Benefits, supra note 92, at 796 (describing the opposite example where
corporate stakeholders would be reluctant to make firm-specific investments in public companies
“run by widely dispersed but powerful shareholders, some of whom might be tempted to pump up
share price by making opportunistic threats”).
172. Id. at 808.
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arguably, most of which have not even any indirect (tangible or intangible)
positive effect on the corporation.173 For some time, it seemed unclear
whether charitable contributions would, indeed, be permissible (or whether
they would rather be ultra vires, thus, resulting in director liability for
allocating corporate assets to non-corporate purposes), but once A.P. Smith
Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow was decided in 1953,174 their legality has no
longer been in question.175
h. Inevitable Shareholding Asymmetries
The Berle-Means corporation inevitably evidences shareholder
asymmetries (or schisms) since shareholders—widely dispersed among
various spectrums (sophistication, financial wherewithal, diversification,
pooling, appetite for risk, short-, mid- and long-term return expectations,
tax treatment, etc.) are by no means a homogeneous group.176 Within any
current group of shareholders at any point in time, individual shareholder
interests will necessarily vary (and, as evidenced by shareholder majority
decisions and the absence of unanimous shareholder decisions—for
example, on corporate mergers—will regularly contradict each other);
shareholders may favor short-term vs. long-term investment strategies; their
holding of fractional interests in the corporation may differentiate among
various classes (and series) of common stock and preferred stock (with
according differences on shareholder returns that are attributable to the
relative economic rights of such different varieties of stock); most
shareholders will have different investment entry points (with, for example,
some shareholders purchasing stock at $.50 to the dollar after the
corporation has encountered losses and other shareholders purchasing the
same stock at $1.50 to the dollar during the same corporation’s heavily
oversubscribed initial public offering).177 Obviously, proponents of the

173. Cf. Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 4, at 308 (finding charitable contributions
controversial because they can be a “form of self-aggrandizing or self-promoting behaviour by
management”).
174. A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 581 (N.J. 1953), appeal dismissed, 346 U.S.
861 (1953).
175. Indeed, Adolf Berle, the most vocal opponent at the time of the broad field now known as
‘corporate social responsibility’ (in which corporate charitable giving is often regarded as a tool
for corporations to “do the right thing”), conceded defeat of his shareholder primacy model
because of this decision. BERLE, CAPITALIST REVOLUTION, supra note 124. See also
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 222–23; Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra
note 3, at 561 n.70. The debate between Adolf Berle and Merrick Dodd in the 1930s established
the roots of ‘corporate social responsibility’ as a normative alternative to shareholder value
models of the firm. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
176. See Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 4, at 307; Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching
Dodge v. Ford, supra note 14, at 9.
177. Cf. Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts, supra note 75, at 21; Bainbridge, Shareholder
Disempowerment, supra note 75, at 1745; Wallman, Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 41, at
808 n.5 (asking which shareholders are enjoying primacy, “[t]oday’s or tomorrow’s (presumably
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efficient capital markets hypothesis (ECMH) try to solve this asymmetry by
declaring that shareholder wealth maximization translates into maximizing
the current share price of the corporation in order to harmonize, for
example, present and future shareholder interests.178 However, in my
judgment, such solution significantly broadens the corporate end (away
from any shareholderist model, that is) and simply restates the core purpose
of the business corporation, namely that it should aspire to be as profitable
as possible at any future point in time based on corporate actions taken or
not taken today. It is simply the statement of a wealth maximization ideal
with no impact on necessarily disparate actual shareholder interests (and the
resultant potential for intershareholder opportunism) tomorrow or at any
point thereafter, or the significance of such disparate actual interests on the
actions taken or not taken by corporate directors today.
i. Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes
To date, over thirty states have adopted so-called nonshareholder
constituency statutes as part of their respective state corporate statutes,
thereby amending the existing statutory fiduciary duty framework for
corporate directors.179 Under such constituency statutes, directors are
permitted (in Connecticut, even required) to consider both the short- and
long-term effects of their decisions on not only the shareholders of the
corporation but also on a varying list of other constituents of the firm, such
as employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, and the local communities in
which the corporation operates.180 Arguably, more than half of the state
corporation statutes have thus adopted a managerialist (rather than
shareholder-centric) view of the corporation where senior management is
given broad discretion to give due and fair consideration to all factors of
production (stakeholder interests) that constitute the firm.181 Recognizing
the respective interests of such nonshareholder firm participants—or
stakeholders—is not surprising182 but rather emphasizes that shareholder
not yesterday’s)?,” “[a]bitrageurs or long-term shareholders?,” or “[t]ax-exempt institutions or
taxable individuals?”).
178. Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 4, at 306; Wallman, Purpose of a Corporation,
supra note 41, at 808.
179. See, e.g., Anthony Bisconti, Note, The Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency Statutes
Protect Socially Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 768
n.13 (2009) (counting 32 states with corporate constituency statutes). See also Hart, An
Economist’s View, supra note 4, at 305 n.17; Wallman, Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 41,
at 810.
180. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 223–25; Wallman, Purpose of a
Corporation, supra note 41, at 810.
181. Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5, at 1403.
182. What is a bit surprising (or, at least, counter-intuitive on first blush) are the circumstances
of how constituency statutes came about as legislative amendments to state corporate statutes,
designed to insulate board directors from personal liability in corporate takeover battles. “In many
cases, the force behind these [amendments seem to have] been incumbent management” in efforts
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interests are never at the center (or, depending on semantics, are always at
the center) of a sound business decision of a given board of directors. My
final point of critique addresses this semantic conundrum.183
j. Inevitable Firm Investment Asymmetries
By economic necessity, the interests of a Berle-Means corporation—as
a whole and as a going concern—cannot be congruent with and identical to
the interests of its shareholders (or, as a semantic alternative, the interests of
the corporation can only be completely congruent and identical—at all
times—with the interests of its shareholders). The corporation provides a
mechanism for shareholders to gain returns on their investment. But that is
the case with any other firm participant. In this regard, the wealthmaximization or profit-seeking motive of the corporation is a means to an
end, not an end in itself.184 And the end is not shareholder wealth
maximization, it is wealth maximization for all firm participants who
otherwise would not be willing to invest in the first place if their respective
interests to gain returns on firm-specific investments would have to yield to
specific shareholder interests routinely and as a matter of law (assuming, for
a moment, that shareholder interests could indeed be expressed una voce).
There is also (obviously) an even larger end in benefiting society as a
whole185 by conducting entrepreneurial activity within the corporate form
rather than relying solely on market competition and contractual
arrangements. Indeed, market forces push for such entrepreneurial activity
to be organized within a firm—a hierarchical structure sheltered, as far as
its inner organization is concerned, from market forces to a certain extent
which gives it a competitive advantage over non-firm structures of
entrepreneurial organization. Ronald Coase’s famous 1937 inquiry into the
to fight off hostile takeovers. Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 4, at 305 n.17. Accordingly,
they must be regarded as entrenchment tools for corporate boards, helping such boards to insulate
themselves even more from a (predatory) market for corporate control than the reach of the
business judgment rule may have insulated them before, and clearly—as night and day or black
and white—declaring shareholders (and their interests and purported primacy) as merely inter
pares. See Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 4, at 305 n.17; Roberta Romano, The Political
Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 122–37 (1987) (focusing on the developments
in Connecticut).
183. This semantic conundrum relates to my earlier description of the shareholder primacy
model above: Firm value is, ipso facto, shareholder value (and vice versa). While this may be a
correct statement in complete abstract terms (i.e., a mere theoretical application of the profitseeking motive of the for-profit business corporation), I believe it makes a distinct difference in
corporate reality when you tell management: “create shareholder value!” instead of “create firm
value!” (or—not and!—vice versa). The almost constant lamentations of corporate managers over
the pressures created by mandatory quarterly financial reports and the expectations of stock
analysts that inevitably go with it—all of which often relegate long-term strategic management of
the corporation to an afterthought—appear to be good evidence of such difference in profitseeking commands.
184. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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nature of the firm provides exactly this explanation.186 As far as
microtheoretical models of the firm reach, we can say that all firm inputs—
all firm-specific investments and, thus, all firm participants—matter for
purposes of productive gains.187 And it is clear from the plain and
straightforward rules of American corporate law ‘on the books’ that
directors are permitted (if not, required) to routinely and diligently consider
the interests of all factors of production (i.e. all firm participants) and,
therefore, of corporate constituencies other than shareholders,188 in order to
decide on behalf of all firm participant interests (i.e., the interest of the
corporation as a whole—whether regarded as a separate entity or a mere
aggregation of firm inputs) what is in the best interest of the whole
construct organized and sheltered from the market in the form of the
incorporated firm.
k. Conclusion
Shareholder wealth maximization is not an answer, an end in itself, but
just a repetition of the second, substantive question of corporate governance
(“Whose Interest(s) Control(s)?”) cleverly disguised as an answer. Because
of the residual claimant position of shareholders189 and the for-profit motive
of the business corporation,190 it is perhaps reflexively appropriate to
subject the best-interest decisionmaking of corporate directors under an
‘umbrella label’ of shareholder wealth maximization. But this is only
semantics—a mere labeling exercise (probably a convenient, somewhat
self-hypnotic labeling exercise) in order to not have to ask the fundamental
question of how maximization is to be done in any particularized context;
how the diverse, short-, mid- and long-term interests of a highly dispersed
and asymmetrical shareholder base that expects at least some return on its
investment translate into actions taken by a board of directors that not only
pays nominal, ceremonial homage to such a mixed bag of interests but, in
186. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. See also Coase, supra note 8, at 393 (“Outside
the firm, price movements direct production, which is co-ordinated through a series of exchange
transactions on the market. Within a firm, these market transactions are eliminated and in place of
the complicated market structure with exchange transactions is substituted the entrepreneur-coordinator, who directs production.”).
187. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., Wallman, Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 41, at 810.
189. See CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 13, at 18–19.
[A]lthough the corporation has numerous and perhaps all-encompassing duties to
these [stakeholders other than shareholders], it is the shareholders who have the claim
on the residual value of the enterprise, that is, what’s left after all definite obligations
are satisfied, and the managers have an affirmative open-ended obligation to increase
this residual value, rather than the wealth of some other affected group (including
themselves).
Id.; Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 4, at 303.
190. Cf. COX & HAZEN, supra note 4, at 3.
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fact, actuates them properly in the board decisionmaking process; and, most
fundamentally and crucially, how director behavior can be properly
incentivized in order to do exactly that—to pay not only nominal,
ceremonial homage but, indeed, to act in the best interest of the corporation
over and over and over again. The argument that is usually proffered
against stakeholderist models of the corporation by shareholder
primacists—namely that “a broad definition of [director] fiduciary duty is
essentially vacuous, because it allows management to justify almost any
action on the grounds that it benefits some [stakeholder] group”191—can
and must be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the shareholder wealth
maximization model itself: It is essentially vacuous because the substantive
and procedural interplays of the fiduciary duty of care and the business
judgment rule allow management to justify virtually any action on the
grounds that it benefits shareholders as a group.192
To put it more bluntly: It can be said that shareholder primacy is a not a
(legal) mandate but more of a shorthand cloak designed to (perhaps
conveniently) cover what is really going on. In a model of corporate
governance, it is a simple trick that is rephrasing the question as an answer
but is logically no answer at all but a ruse. The shareholder primacy
model—through its critical reliance on the shareholder wealth maximization
norm as the controlling and critical variable—pretends to explain the real
world phenomenon of investor confidence ex ante.193 Given, however, that
shareholder wealth maximization has no discernable meaning ex ante (and
also does not provide for any discernable director accountability ex post
under current American corporate law rules), its predictive ability—if we
are indeed to rely, at least, on the rhetoric of shareholder value194—must
come from somewhere else and combine with this rhetoric in order to make
the model functional. In my judgment, how the model’s functionality is
achieved (and through what kind of an instrumentarium), how the model
operates precisely step-by-step, how shareholder value is tied effectively to
board decisionmaking and genuinely controls the latter—all of these
questions, to date, are left entirely open and unexplained.
2. The Contractarian Model
Who Controls: ‘Nexus’ of explicit and implicit contracts (no
individual group of firm participants controls the firm).
Whose Interest(s) Control(s): Shareholders (indirectly, all firm
participants exert some influence since shareholders are residual claimants).

191.
192.
193.
194.

Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 4, at 303 (emphasis added).
See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
Cf. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 407.

2011]

Deconstructing Corporate Governance

381

Main Locus: Quadrant II; with, perhaps, a bit of Quadrant IV
(shareholder interests control; other firm participants interests are
recognized in the majoritarian bargaining defaults which constitute
corporate law; board of directors/management is fully accountable).
Description. In 1976, the destruction of the formalistic corporate-law
construct of the firm began in earnest195 when Michael Jensen and William
Meckling published their now seminal article on the theory of the firm,
describing therein the corporation as an intricate ‘nexus’ (or network)196 of
interdependent interactions and complex (mostly implicit) ‘contracting’197
relationships among various participants investing resources within the
business of the firm.198 The contractarian (or nexus-of-contracts) model of
the corporate firm was conceived. At its heart, it accepts that firm
participants whose interests intersect within the corporate nexus are all
endowed with relative bargaining positions and relative investment/wealth
values. They then simply engage in a combination of explicit and implicit
contractual and quasi-contractual arrangements in order to create the
construct (or nexus) of the firm.199 As a result, the corporation is merely a
consensual ordering of relations among firm participants which,
accordingly, is to be governed by such voluntary private-party ordering and
no mandatory governmental regulation.200 All that corporate law then does
is to provide a dispositive (or permissive)201 structure—as a majoritarian
195. Cf. Klausner, supra note 46, at 781 (describing the impact of the contractarian theory of
the firm as “providing a conceptual starting point—a clearing of the analytic underbrush—for
further work”).
196. Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5, at 1401.
197. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
198. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 17, at 305. Of similar importance was Eugene Fama’s
1980 article on the same topic, Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88
J. POLITICAL ECON. 288 (1980) [hereinafter Fama, Agency Problems]. Jensen and Meckling’s
article was based on earlier work published by Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production,
Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972), and Fama and
Jensen later collaborated in another important contribution, Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen,
The Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983). See also BAINBRIDGE,
CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 49, at 27–33; Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 819;
Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra note 3, at 599; Millon, supra note 4, at 229;
O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation, supra note 4, at 763.
199. See, e.g., Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1182 (7th Cir.
1990) (“A corporation is not a living person but a set of contracts the terms of which determine
who will bear the brunt of liability.”); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 17 (1991) (“All the terms in corporate governance
are contractual in the sense that they are fully priced in transactions among the interested
parties.”); Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5; Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein,
The Contract Clause and the Corporation, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 767, 770 (1989); Hart, An
Economist’s View, supra note 4, at 306.
200. See, e.g., COX & HAZEN, supra note 4, at 42; Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note
3, at 551; Garrett, supra note 14, at 137; O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation, supra note
4, at 755. See also supra note 44 and accompanying text.
201. Cf. HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 24, at 331 (explaining how corporate law, in large
part, is a set of permissive default rules subject to alteration by firm participants).
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default202—through which the relative investment/wealth values of firm
participants, held together by the contractarian nexus of the firm, are
constantly created, divided, re-created, adjusted, and sometimes (perhaps,
oftentimes) also destroyed203—though the latter would likely have to be
seen as a failure of proper ‘contracting’ or as the materialization of the
transactional and stochastic risks created by necessarily ‘incomplete’ longterm relational204 contracts.205
Thus viewed, corporate law is simply our response to a pragmatic
problem of creating and dividing economic rents while reducing transaction
costs to a minimum.206 And, like a general partnership (at least, pursuant to
the position taken under the original Uniform Partnership Act of 1916), the
corporation is nothing more than a mere aggregation of individual firm
participants who own the factors of production within the organizational

202. The majoritarian default describes the neoclassical view that corporate statutes, as
legislative and dispositive-only default provisions, merely provide those standard provisions
necessary for ordering the corporate nexus which a majority of firm participants would have
chosen and contracted for anyhow if contracting with all other firm participants could occur with
limited to no transaction costs and maximum completeness. Therefore, corporate law constitutes
nothing else but the sum total of all standardized terms of implicit contracts which economists
posit would be entered into over and over again by rational investors under similar circumstances
if actual negotiation and drafting of those terms were indeed possible. See, e.g., COX & HAZEN,
supra note 4, at 42; HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 24, at 330–31.
203. Cf. Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra note 3, at 600 (discussing how particular
changes since the mid-1980s in the overall financial and commercial environment in which
corporations operate have “altered the relative value and bargaining endowments of those whose
interests intersected through the metaphorical corporate nexus,” and concluding that corporate law
“provides the structure through which both the creation and division of value takes place”).
204. Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854 (1978).
205. In a firm nexus that is characterized by operational uncertainty and complexity as well as
by bounded rationality of its participants, it is inevitable that the long-term ‘contractual’
arrangements made by such participants are necessarily incomplete (i.e., they do not address, and
provide ex ante solutions for, all possible contingencies). Cf. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW,
supra note 4, at 226; Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5, at 1400, 1405; Hart, Norms
and Theory, supra note 96. In other words, uncertainty exists because of the “lack of knowledge
of what the future will bring, [i.e., because of the lack of knowledge] of all stochastic variables.”
Richter, supra note 45, at 175 n.22. See, e.g., Alces, supra note 125, at 241–42; Bainbridge, The
Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 556 n.44; Meurer, supra note 9, at 739. See also Dooley, supra
note 11, at 465 (“If there were no bounded rationality, including no limitations on human foresight
or the ability to acquire and process information, individuals could write completely specified
contingent contracts.”); Diego Gambetta, Can We Trust Trust?, in TRUST: MAKING AND
BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 213, 218 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988) (“If we were blessed
with an unlimited computational ability to map out all possible contingencies in enforceable
contracts, trust would not be a problem.”) (reference omitted).
206. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 199, at 5 (stating that the corporate contract will
provide for governance structures that are “most beneficial to investors, net of the costs of
maintaining the structure”); Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5; Fama, Agency
Problems, supra note 198, at 289–90. See also Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra note
3, at 600; Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 823 (stating that the nexus-of-contract theory of the firm
conceives the corporation simply as “the product of market forces”).
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structure of the firm207 and proceed to explicitly and implicitly contract with
each other for their cooperative use by the firm (i.e., everyone)—a natural
product of private-party initiative and market competition without much, if
any, of a separate (entity) existence in the law.208 Accordingly, if the
corporate governance structure provided by the default provisions209 of
corporate statutes does not satisfy the circumstances of a particular firm, the
firm participants (in particular, shareholders) can contract out of them and
can create an individualized, customized corporate charter that reflects the
particular nexus of such firm—at least, as long as transaction costs of
contracting are assumed to be zero or negligible.210
Critique. The contractarian model has always run into problems when
confronted with the real world.211 It is premised on the simplifying (but
surreal) assumption of the “Coasean World”212 of an ideal market
comprised of perfectly rational and omniscient economic decisionmakers:
everyone in the market knows everything there is to know about prices,
demand, product quality, firm organization, etc., and has the ability to
infinitely contract according to changing needs.213 In reality, the
207. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (“A corporation is, after all, but an association
of individuals under an assumed name . . . .”); Fama, Agency Problems, supra note 198, at 289–
90.
208. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 199, at 12; Allen, Contracts and
Communities, supra note 5; Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 548; Millon, supra
note 4, at 201–02, 211, 213. See also Klausner, supra note 46, at 779 (“At its broadest theoretical
level, this transformation reconceived the corporation as a contractual entity and reconceived
corporate law as a largely passive adjunct to the contracting process that creates a corporation.”).
Indeed, it can be argued that the nexus-of-contracts conception of the corporation is not a theory
of the firm at all, it is a theory of why there is no firm (since the Coasean solution to the boundaryof-the-firm problem has been evaporated and all direction of firm affairs now only occurs under
contracting/negotiation/market paradigms). See Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 832; Millon, supra
note 4, at 229.
209. Klausner, supra note 46, at 780; Rock & Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law, supra note 5,
at 1617.
210. Klausner, supra note 46, at 780, 796. But see Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra
note 3, at 607.
211. See, e.g., Klausner, supra note 46, at 779 (concluding that “while the contractarian theory
was a useful starting point for economic analysis of corporate law, more recent research
demonstrates that as a description of reality, or a basis for policy prescription, the theory falls
short”). See also In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 938 (Del. Ch. 2003).
Delaware law should not be based on a reductionist view of human nature that
simplifies human motivations on the lines of the least sophisticated notions of the law
and economics movement. Homo sapiens is not merely homo economicus. We may be
thankful that an array of other motivations exist that influence human behavior; not all
are any better than greed or avarice, think of envy, to name just one. But also think of
motives like love, friendship, and collegiality, think of those among us who direct their
behavior as best they can on a guiding creed or set of moral values.
Id.

212. Klausner, supra note 46, at 796.
213. See HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 24, at 331; KNIGHT, supra note 4, at 197 (“Chief
among the simplifications of reality prerequisite to the achievement of perfect competition is . . .
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fundamental corporate governance structures and mechanisms commonly
adopted by Berle-Means corporations in the United States (i.e.,

the assumption of practical omniscience on the part of every member of the competitive system.”);
Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5, at 1396, 1405.
The only management task that seems to remain, and which is the focus of attention
in the firm of traditional price theory, is the selection of profit-maximizing quantities of
outputs and inputs. But, since the required information for doing this is also freely in
hand, and the required calculations are costless to make, the model strips management
of any meaningful productivity in the performance of even these tasks. The cost of
maximizing is ignored or implicitly assumed to be zero. De facto, the resources that
might be required to make maximizing decisions are treated as if they are not scarce.
Demsetz, supra note 44, at 143 (footnote omitted). But see Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise,
supra note 3, at 607; Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 4, at 300 (“The neoclassical theory of
the firm, although useful, portrays the modern business enterprise in caricature terms.”); Mitchell,
Importance of Being Trusted, supra note 85; O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation, supra
note 4, at 757; Ripken, supra note 63, at 165; Sheehy, supra note 15, at 22.
See also ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO
THEORY AND PRACTICE 53–55 (1990) (summarizing the assumptions underlying neoclassical
economic theory, including (i) that economic actors always behave rationally and in a selfinterested manner, and (ii) that economic actors have complete and perfect information available
in their pursuit of economic opportunities); Douglass C. North, Structure and Performance: The
Task of Economic History, 16 J. ECON. LIT. 963, 964 (1978) (summarizing the same assumptions
as “(1) perfectly competitive markets, (2) perfectly specified and costlessly enforced property
rights, (3) neutral government, and (4) unchanging tastes”). The artifice of those test conditions
(as well as their cumulative effect) has, of course, been famously parodied by economist and
Nobel laureate George Stigler in his Conference Handbook. George J. Stigler, The Conference
Handbook, 85 J. POL. ECON. 441 (1977). According to his Handbook, all we need to say here for
support of the point made above is “9-13-14-16-23-24-30” which numerical labels stand for,
respectively:
9. The conclusions change if you introduce uncertainty.
...
13.The market cannot, of course, deal satisfactorily with that externality.
14. But what if transaction costs are not zero?
...
16. Of course, if you allow for the investment in human capital, the entire picture
changes.
...
23. The motivation of the agents in this theory is so narrowly egotistic that it cannot
possibly explain the behavior of real people.
24. The flabby economic actor in this impressionistic model should be replaced by the
utility-maximizing individual.
...
30. The paper is rigidly confined by the paradigm of neoclassical economics, so large
parts of urgent reality are outside its comprehension.
Id. at 442–43.
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predominantly, the Delaware General Corporation Law)214 are static and
uniform: firm participants make no contractual commitments to change or
maintain such statutory default structures and mechanisms during either the
formation phase, the public offering phase, or the remaining lifespan phase
of the corporation215 and, but for protecting incumbent management from
hostile takeovers, charter documents show very little diversity and
deliberate contracting away from default rules.216 As Michael Klausner
succinctly put it after a review of over 600 charters of corporations involved
in either an initial public offering or a spinoff: “Corporate charters come in
one flavor: plain vanilla.”217
In addition, leading contractarian scholars also adopt the traditional
shareholder primacy argument that shareholders, as the firm’s residual
claimants are, thus, assumed to act as ultimate principals in a set of explicit
and implicit agency contracts that hire the firm’s productive resources,
thereby establishing the nexus that makes up the firm.218 Shareholders
therefore retain a special position within the nexus—primus inter pares
among the corporation’s other constituencies—and enjoy a ‘contract’ with
the firm (nexus) that grants them ownership-like rights, including as
beneficiaries of fiduciary obligations owed to them by directors.219 In other
words, shareholder primacy is simply a majoritarian ‘contractual’ default
rule.220
As such, the contractarian model has positive (i.e., descriptive and
empirical) value221—in particular, for pointing out that the central, critical
participant within the firm nexus is its manager who puzzles together (and
214. See, e.g., Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1559, 1592 (2002) (finding from his analysis of an empirical sample of over 6,000 firms that went
public between 1978–2000, that over seventy percent of those firms incorporated in Delaware
during the second half of this period). See also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’
Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383 (2003); Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law
Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 527 (2001); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product:
Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 226 (1985); Guhan
Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32 (2004); Guhan
Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choices: Evidence on the
“Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795 (2002).
215. See Klausner, supra note 46, at 781–82.
216. See Klausner, supra note 46, at 790. There are empirical studies that support this finding.
John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89 CALIF. L.
REV. 1301 (2001). See generally Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize
Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83 (2001); Laura Casares
Field & Jonathan M. Karpoff, Takeover Defenses of IPO Firms, 57 J. FIN. 1857 (2002).
217. Klausner, supra note 46, at 790 (footnote omitted).
218. See, e.g., Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5; Blair & Stout, Team
Production, supra note 49; O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation, supra note 4, at 755.
219. Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 548; Blair & Stout, Director
Accountability, supra note 58, at 410.
220. Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 833. See also Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra
note 58, at 416–17 (discussing the preference for shareholder primacy in contractarian corporate
theory).
221. Cf. Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 4, at 300; Klausner, supra note 46, at 779, 796.
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constantly, re-puzzles and re-juggles) all ‘contractual’ inputs for purposes
of corporate adaptation and success.222 However—notwithstanding the
normative prescriptive force of its neoclassical-economics-derived,
minimalist account of what corporate law should be223—not much modeling
and conceptualizing help can be expected when one ventures into the
second (substantive) question of corporate governance, “Whose Interest(s)
Control(s)?”.224 Indeed, the reversion to shareholder wealth maximization
as the central decision-guiding norm of corporate decisionmakers shortcircuits and avoids answering such a normative question (as has been
pointed out before225).226 A realistic (rather than idealistic) view of the
corporation must recognize that firms are much more than the result of
‘contracts,’ (i.e., actual bargains, explicit or implicit) which result in their
respective organizational structures and internal order and provides the
necessary inner cohesion for what are often hundreds of thousands of
individual factors of production in a single Berle-Means corporation.227
Unless, of course, we rubricate (wholesale, that is) all those critical
variables which are necessary and currently unexplained for in
microtheoretical models (for example, ‘trust,’ ‘loyalty,’ and similar sociocontextual,228 behavior-oriented and reciprocal229 variables230 based on precoded
‘expectations,’
‘counter-expectations,’
and
‘expectationexpectations’ and aimed at reducing social complexity231) as implicit actual

222. See HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 24, at 332.
223. Cf. Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5, at 1405; Eisenberg, supra note 7, at
824, 836; Klausner, supra note 46.
224. Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 836 (“[T]he nexus-of-contracts conception, as a positive
description, has no normative implications.”).
225. See supra text accompanying notes 189–194.
226. Cf. O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation, supra note 4, at 766.
227. Cf. Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5, at 1402; Stout, Mythical Benefits,
supra note 92, at 797–98. Included in such ‘much more’ would be, at a minimum, any non-legally
enforced reciprocal arrangements in the form of social norms (i.e., protolegal variables as, for
example, trust), the distribution of property rights within the firm and, thus, among the means of
production, the bureaucratic rules of the internal governance organization of the firm, and the
hierarchical, command-and-control structure of the firm’s organization in the form of unilateral
directions by superiors to subordinates made by fiat rather than through negotiation. See, e.g.,
Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 836.
228. See Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 77, at 13. In addition, it is clear that at least some
part of what we consider ‘corporate law’ consists of mandatory rules that are not subject to
enforceable contractual deviations. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 823–24.
229. Cf. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity,
14 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 159, 159 (2000) (“Reciprocity means that in response to friendly
actions, people are frequently much nicer and much more cooperative than predicted by the selfinterest model; conversely, in response to hostile actions they are frequently much more nasty and
even brutal.”). See also Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 822 (stating that, pursuant to the nexus-ofcontract conception of the firm, “the corporation is a nexus of reciprocal arrangements”).
230. See supra note 97 at accompanying text.
231. Cf. NIKLAS LUHMANN, LOVE AS PASSION: THE CODIFICATION OF INTIMACY (Jeremy
Gaines & Doris L. Jones trans., 1986).
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bargains, ergo ‘contracts.’232 In case of such a presupposition exercise,
however, the nexus-of-contracts model of the firm still owes us a good
explanation as to what those ‘contracts’ exactly are and how they come into
being and become part of the nexus.233
3. The Team Production Model
Who Controls: Board (as a mediating hierarch by delegation of, and
with accountability to, all firm participants).
Whose Interest(s) Control(s): All firm participants (directly as a
team).
Main Locus: Quadrants II & IV (all stakeholders interests control,
not only shareholder interests; board of directors/management remains
accountable as a mediator who needs to give all firm interests involved their
relative weight and distributional merit).
Description. In 1999, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout introduced a new
way of thinking about corporate governance,234 formulating their ‘team
production’ theory of the firm.235 It is designed as a logical (and
complementary) progression from the nexus-of-contracts model of the firm
You cannot live without forming expectations with respect to contingent events and you
have to neglect, more or less, the possibility of disappointment. You neglect this
because it is a very rare possibility, but also because you do not know what else to do.
The alternative is to live in a state of permanent uncertainty and to withdraw
expectations without having anything with which to replace them.
Niklas Luhmann, Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives, in TRUST: MAKING
AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 94, 97 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988). See also Blair &
Stout, Trust, supra note 70, at 1796; Geoffrey P. Miller, Norms and Interests, 32 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 637 (2003); Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., supra note 49, at 191; Lynn A. Stout, The
Investor Confidence Game, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 407, 410–15 (2002) [hereinafter Stout, Investor
Confidence].
232. Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 823 (preferring the term “nexus of reciprocal arrangements”
over “nexus of contracts”).
233. Cf. Klausner, supra note 46, at 781–82 (pointing out that “non-legal economic or
reputational sanctions” outside of the legally enforceable “corporate contract” as defined in
contractarian theory are necessary in order to explain the governance structures and mechanisms
of the firm); id. at 797 (“By failing to account for transaction costs, the contractarian theory fails
to explain the reality of either the content of firms’ corporate governance commitments or the
process by which those commitments are formed.”). In addition, the nexus-of-contracts model of
the firm still owes us a good explanation as to why those ‘contracts’ should be legally enforceable
on a wholesale basis, in particular, given the fact that the large, publicly-held incorporate firm
creates a wide range of adverse third-party effects (i.e., negative externalities). See, e.g.,
Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 824; René Reich-Graefe, Deconstructing Corporate Governance:
Director Primacy Without Principle?, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 465 (forthcoming 2011)
(discussing negative externalities, i.e., social costs, generated by the corporate endeavor).
234. See Mitchell, Trust and Team Production, supra note 12, at 870.
235. Blair & Stout, Corporate Law, supra note 74. See also supra note 74 and accompanying
text. It should be noted that Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, as economists, first described
the firm organization requiring multiple productive inputs and producing nonseparable outputs
that are not easily attributable to their respective productive inputs as a “team production.” See
Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 198, at 779–81.
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in that it views corporate law as a mechanism for filling in gaps in
situations where team participants in the firm have found explicit
contracting too difficult or even impossible given the very real transaction
costs of such explicit contracting.236 At its core, the team production model
is premised on three factual features which are all prevalent in the corporate
firm. First, the economic production (i.e., the creation of firm value)
requires a team of firm participants (i.e., two parties or more).237 Second,
every firm-participant team member makes an illiquid, firm-specific or
‘team-specific’ investment into the corporate venture.238 The idea of a
‘team-specific’ investment is that the productive factor invested will have a
significantly higher value and likelihood for return when used within the
team framework than when compared with its second-best use.239 And
lastly, firm ‘rents’—i.e., the economic output-gains of the firm as a result of
team production—are often joint and, thus, nonseparable along the same
lines that firm inputs (i.e., the team-specific investments) were separable
from each other prior to their injection into the firm. In other words, it
proves difficult to attribute any particular portion of the gains to any
particular team member’s contribution.240 A further structural problem is
created by the fact that firm-specific investments are often sunk—i.e.,
neither the original investment nor any return the investment may have
generated or may generate in the future can be easily and unilaterally
extracted from the firm by the investing firm participant.241
Firm-specific investments are obviously essential for the creation of
value by the firm. They will only be made if the correlation between the
investment and the probability of its return (i.e., its divisional share of the
236. Blair & Stout, Corporate Law, supra note 74, at 254.
237. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 419; Blair & Stout, Corporate
Law, supra note 74, at 249; Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49, at 745. See also
Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 198, at 779. Investments become ‘team-specific,’ at least, in part,
since they do not have much if any value in the external market (e.g., time, energy, ideas invested,
financial capital spent on specialized equipment, renting factory space, etc.) and their inherent
value therefore remains latent, i.e., it depends on whether or not the team production exercise is
successful in producing valuable outputs which then generate returns on the team’s total
investment that can then be somehow shared by the team members. See Blair & Stout, Director
Accountability, supra note 58, at 420.
238. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 419; Stout, Mythical Benefits,
supra note 92.
239. Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49, at 745.
240. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 419; Blair & Stout, Team
Production, supra note 49, at 745; Blair & Stout, Corporate Law, supra note 74, at 265–66. See
also Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 198, at 779.
241. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 420 (stating that the resources
which team members have invested in the firm “often cannot be recouped once team production
has begun” and that “team members cannot protect their interest by threatening to withdraw these
resources and sell them to some third party in the marketplace”); Blair & Stout, Team Production,
supra note 49, at 745 (explaining that “investors cannot easily recover the full value of their
money after it has been spent on specialized equipment and salaries” and that those investors
“must wait until team production begins before they see a return on their investment”).
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value created, even if nonseparable) over time is sufficiently predictable
and satisfactory ex ante. Therefore, it seems appropriate and necessary for
team production members (i.e., the firm participants making team-specific
investments) to delegate exclusive authority in order to organize firm
inputs, distribute firm outputs, and resolve interest conflicts among team
production members to the board of directors as a mediating hierarch,242
(i.e., a kind of referee).243 The board is accordingly charged with a complex
balancing act aimed at serving all stakeholder interests in the firm
(including those of shareholders).244 It is charged by each and every team
member to: (i) mediate among the competing interests and demands of all
the stakeholders and their respective investments involved; and (ii) “protect
[all stakeholders’] return on their [respective] investments from postinvestment opportunistic behavior” and illicit return-seeking (or returnprotecting) by other stakeholders.245 Given the nexus of firm-specific assets
invested by team participants, the board serves as a ‘trustee’246 (or
‘fiduciary’247 or ‘trusted mediator’248) for the entire firm as a productive
whole but remains insulated from any direct command and control of any
group or class of team participants.249 What is enough is that, structurally,
board governance offers firm participants the promise of “business
continuity”250 (and, thus, of a continued stream of returns on investment for
everyone).
Critique. The board as a mediating hierarch is an economic agent for all
firm participants. Unlike the shareholder primacy model, the team
242. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 408, 421; Blair & Stout,
Corporate Law, supra note 74, at 250.
243. Cf. Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 593; O’Kelley, Theory of the
Modern Corporation, supra note 4, at 756.
244. See Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49, at 744; Wallman, Purpose of a
Corporation, supra note 41.
245. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 421 (describing the ideal scenario
in which the board as a mediating hierarch decides which team member receives what share of the
surplus “with an eye toward maximizing the total surplus, while ensuring that each team member
receives a large enough share to induce her to invest optimally in team production in the first
place”); Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra note 3, at 603. See Steven M.H. Wallman,
The Proper Interpretation of Corporate Constituency Statutes and Formulation of Director
Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 163, 170 (1991) (stating that the “interests of the corporation also
include the interwoven interests of its various constituencies, such as shareholders, employees,
customers, the local community, and others” and that “these constituencies’ interests are balanced
by the board of directors acting in the best interests of the corporation as a whole, as opposed to
the best interests of any one particular constituency”).
246. Blair & Stout, Corporate Law, supra note 74, at 291; Blair & Stout, Team Production,
supra note 49, at 746. See also DeMott, supra note 79 (stating that “directors occupy a trustee-like
position”).
247. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 425; Blair & Stout, Corporate
Law, supra note 74, at 291.
248. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58.
249. Id. at 408, 421; Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49, at 746.
250. Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101, 110 (1979).
See also Stout, Mythical Benefits, supra note 92, at 797.
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production model correctly assumes that the board must be equipped with
unlimited allocational and distributional powers in order to mediate
conflicts among the various corporate constituencies.251 The board must be
able to attract and allocate team-specific investments as well as distribute
correlative benefits as it sees fit. And it is an often underestimated fact that
every single board decision does both—allocates resources and distributes
(future) benefits—simultaneously and often with allocative and distributive
effects to multiple if not (at least, indirectly) all firm participants.252 The
result is that no agent-participant group can have an overriding interest that
would bind the board to act in any particular way. Indeed, the board can act
(i.e., mediate) in any way it wishes since the collective interests of all firm
participants are, at best, inextricably diffuse.253 Correspondingly, Blair and
Stout argue that directors are not subject to direct control or supervision by
anyone, including the firm’s shareholders.254
Notwithstanding this unlimited, near-absolute power to mediate,255 the
team production model insists that the board of directors remains somehow
accountable to the productive team and all of its participants, namely as a
‘trustee’ and ‘fiduciary’ to whom team members have ceded control.256 But
the model only assumes, and does not explain, how such accountability

251. In fairness, it should be noted that the Blair/Stout Team Production Model is not only a
microtheoretical model but also genuinely macrotheoretical in that it ventures explicitly and
conceptually into the inevitably allocational and distributional spheres of the decisional
governance of the corporation. In this regard, it can be said that the Team Production Model is
dualistic in nature (as is, of course, the nature of the firm, cf. Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 827–30)
in that it combines microtheoretical and macrotheoretical conceptions of the firm—at a minimum,
in a descriptive manner. This Article is only concerned with the microtheoretical spheres of the
theory of the firm. I have discussed the macrotheoretical implications of the Blair/Stout Team
Production Model—and how they relate and contrast with the macrotheoretical sphere of the
absolute director primacy model (which sphere is currently, shall we say, still ‘under
construction’)—in a separate article. See Reich-Graefe, supra note 233.
252. What I mean here is that it is (too) often overlooked that, in the reality of the goingconcern operation of the firm, there is no bifurcation whatsoever between the time the board acts
hiring productive resources in order to create value and the time the board acts in order to
distribute to the firm’s value participants the cash flows resulting from the creation of value.
Every time the board (or upper management) acts, including when it hires productive resources, it
instantly allocates and distributes currently available as well as future cash flows among all firm
participants. Thus, on a daily basis, future cash flows are pre-booked, pre-committed and prespent—when money comes in, some of it (or all of it, or even more than it) has already gone out.
Accordingly, there is no factual distinction possible between wealth creation and wealth
distribution; both occur simultaneously once the corporation becomes a going concern.
253. Cf. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 436 (“As a solution to the
contracting problems associated with team production, the mediating board is obviously messy.”).
254. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 408, 421; Blair & Stout, Team
Production, supra note 49, at 746; Blair & Stout, Corporate Law, supra note 74, at 254, 290.
255. Blair & Stout, Corporate Law, supra note 74, at 251 (stating that at the peak of the
corporate hierarchy “sits a board of directors whose authority over the use of corporate assets is
virtually absolute”).
256. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. See also Blair & Stout, Director Accountability,
supra note 58 (trusted mediator).
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would be rooted in either the theory or the practice of corporate law.257
Indeed, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout themselves admit that “team
members who feel they deserve a larger share of the gains from team
production must ultimately either appeal to the directors or abandon their
team-specific investment by exiting the firm.”258 As discussed above, those
post-investment correctives—which depend either on directors being
willing to listen to (and to even act upon) ‘appeals’ or on the possibility to
‘abandon’ an investment that could easily be sunk and, thus, simply ‘nonabandonable’ or only ‘abandonable’ at significant costs that not only could
wipe out any return on the investment but a significant portion or, in some
circumstances, all of the investment itself259—do not seem to help in any
way with firm investments to be made confidently ex ante and with
sufficient predictive accuracy.260 Ultimately, one feels returned to square
one: there does not appear to be “a clear way in principle to evaluate the
performance of those in charge of the deployment of corporate assets, if
their duty is to balance the claims made upon the corporation by a variety of
contesting claimants.”261
Given such circularity in their model, Blair and Stout undertake a bold
step which, in my view, clearly opens a pathway into the right direction for
purposes of modeling with more accuracy (and, thus, predictability) the
governance structure of the publicly-held corporate firm. Without admitting
that their team production model is descriptively circular (i.e., team
members willingly cede control to the board because, structurally, as a
mediating hierarch the board is best equipped to do the right thing, to
mediate among and, thereby, protect their respective returns on
257. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 437.
The mediating hierarchy model suggests that directors must be accountable to all the
firm’s residual claimants. Moreover, directors are accountable for maximizing the total
value of the residual claimants’ interests in the firm. But because the inputs and outputs
of team production are to some extent unverifiable—meaning they cannot be readily
identified and measured by an outside party such as a court—there is no way to set a
substantive standard for gauging how good a job the board is doing.
Id. (emphasis added); id. at 437–38 (stating that procedural performance standards for directors
would cause them as rationally selfish actors to “jump mindlessly through the appropriate
procedural hoops, rather than motivating them to actually do a good job”).
258. Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49, at 746.
259. Which will already result from exiting the team-specific investment and contributing it
thereafter to its non-team-specific second-best use.
260. These correctives may help to encourage some normative agenda across the spectrum ex
ante (and, thus, incentivize firm managements across the spectrum to comply with such agenda),
but they do not help the particular investor who ends up with a particular, disincentivized or ‘nonincentivizable’ firm management and who is forced to (financially) suffer through the corrective
mechanism to come to the ‘rescue’ in her particular case in an attempt by the market to reinforce
the normative agenda across the spectrum. In other words: these correctives distribute highly
inefficient monitoring costs asymmetrically. Unless our investor hedges against such
particularized risk by a widely diversified portfolio, why would she confidently invest ex ante?
261. Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5, at 1406.
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investment—but “there is no way to set a substantive standard for gauging
how good a job the board is doing,”262 thus, there is no way to know preinvestment whether the board is going to do a good job in order to feel
comfortable enough to invest and cede control in the first place),263 Blair
and Stout set out to ‘borrow’ legitimacy (and, apparently, with it
accountability) from outside (corporate) law. They admit that “directors
enjoy enormous legal discretion in how they choose to manage and allocate
corporate resources”264 but also posit that there is a “possible important curb
on director behavior”265 which is, however, nothing that the law provides in
terms of accountability. Such important curb (or constraint) on the
directors’ “virtually absolute”266 authority and discretion over the (mis)use
of corporate assets is found in the “directors’ internalized belief that they
ought to behave in a careful, loyal and trustworthy fashion.”267
That is quite a statement. And I believe that it is absolutely correct. As I
explain more fully in my closing sketches below (as well as, in more detail,
elsewhere),268 our current microtheoretical models of the firm—including
the Blair/Stout team production model—leave us with an uncomfortably
wide gap within each of our respective models as regards their predictive
ability and, thus, their overall accuracy.269 Blair and Stout point us into the
right direction with their focus on trust and (intrinsic) trustworthiness of
corporate directors as underlying safeguards of team-specific investments in
firms.270 However, such focus is not an integral, organic, and constituent
part of their team production model. It is entirely exogenous—a quick fix of
such model, borrowed from outside of the model in order to make the
model work conceptually. Since the fix, in substance, constitutes what I call
‘protolegal variables,’ such focus is definitely also borrowing from outside
the realm of corporate law. There is an a priori realm of normative
substance that pre-exists and controls corporate law without being any part
of it. Thus, in my view, Blair and Stout have correctly figured out that
corporate law is completely irrelevant for purposes of director
accountability. Or to say it differently: corporate law has no answer—no
inner normative intelligibility—when it comes to the second, substantive
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 437 (emphasis added).
And, therefore, otherwise normatively vacuous.
Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 438.
Id.
Blair & Stout, Corporate Law, supra note 74, at 251.
Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 438 (emphases added).
Reich-Graefe, supra note 233.
And I mean a ‘wide gap’—we can safely drive entire trucks through it—both ways—at the
same time—at high speed. We only have a beginning of an inkling of an understanding as to why
directors on corporate boards behave the way they behave and why we cannot find any functional
accountability mechanism within our corporate law that gauges “how good a job the board is
doing.” See Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 437.
270. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 438–43; Blair & Stout, Trust,
supra note 70, at 1735.
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question of corporate governance (“Whose Interest(s) Control(s)?”). As a
result, this question can only be answered by recourse to a protolegal realm
in which variables like those pointed out by Blair and Stout (in particular,
‘trust’ and ‘trustworthiness’) provide the only operational mechanisms of
director accountability that we seem to have available (even though they are
limited and probably not genuine).
4. The Director Primacy Model
Who Controls: Board (as a decisionmaker by fiat).
Whose Interest(s) Control(s): Shareholders (indirectly, all firm
participants exert some influence since shareholders are residual claimants).
Main Locus: Quadrant I; with, perhaps, a bit of Quadrant II
(shareholder interests control; board of directors/management is a sui
generis decisionmaker with almost unlimited powers and very little
accountability within corporate law).
Description. The director primacy model developed by Stephen
Bainbridge in a series of articles271 over the last decade asserts that
corporate directors are the holders of all corporate power272 who can
institute any and all adaptive firm changes by fiat273 and who are controlled
only by the principle that the proper end of any exercise of their power is
shareholder wealth maximization.274 However, this check on directors’
central decisionmaking power is essentially an unenforceable “contractual
obligation to maximize the value of the shareholders’ residual claim.”275
For the first time in microtheoretical models, the board of directors is
boldly acknowledged as a sui generis body within the corporation,276 not
‘hired’ but free from any legal strictures of delegation or fiduciary relation
to a higher, ultimate firm constituent (whether shareholders or other
stakeholders). The board is no longer an agent for anyone, not even the
corporation (or the team) itself.277 Its decisionmaking authority is statutory
(thus, original and non-delegated) and unlimited within the law. Director
primacy, thus, means “the centralization of essentially nonreviewable

271. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. See also Wayne O. Hanewicz, Director
Primacy, Omnicare, and the Function of Corporate Law, 71 TENN. L. REV. 511 (2004).
272. Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 550.
273. Id. at 552. Cf. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 76.
274. Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 550–51; Bainbridge, Convergence
Debate, supra note 2, at 47–48. See also O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation, supra note
4, at 756 n.19.
275. Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 551, 555, 606.
276. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 74; Bainbridge, The Means and Ends,
supra note 3, at 555–56; Bainbridge, Convergence Debate, supra note 2, at 51. But see sources
cited supra note 169.
277. Cf. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 76.
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decisionmaking authority in the board of directors”278 so that the “board has
virtually unconstrained freedom to exercise business judgment.”279
Critique. Professor Bainbridge remains consequent and loyal to his
contractarian roots280 in answering the second, substantive question of
corporate governance—namely, “Whose Interest(s) Control(s)?”—in the
identical fashion that the contractarian model of corporate law has answered
such question (and the shareholder primacy model answered it even before
the contractarian model). Thus, the same critique applicable to the
shareholder primacy model and described above must be levied here. In
essence, there is no contractual (whether explicit or implicit), quasicontractual or ‘contractarian’ obligation on the board of directors to
maximize shareholder value. This is merely an idea—possibly even an
efficient idea in order to orient director decisionmaking overall—but it is by
no means the law. It is impossible to find that there is a legal director
accountability mechanism in place (i.e., a mechanism that is a feature of our
corporate law ‘on the books’) because of a mere ‘contractarian’ idea which
is acknowledged by all as (virtually) unenforceable within the law.
Thus, Bainbridge’s director primacy model deserves full credit for
correctly pointing out the “virtues of fiat”281 as exercised by the corporate
board for purposes of corporate decisionmaking efficiency. But if such
decisionmaking power by fiat—sanctioned by corporate law as
nonreviewable decisionmaking authority by discretionary fiat—indeed
cannot be “trumped by either shareholders or courts,”282 the director
primacy model still owes us an explanation with regard to the normatively
inevitable ‘vices of fiat.’ The power of fiat of the board as a central
decisionmaker may not be used only to effectively address uncertainty and
complexity for purposes of mandating adaptive responses to future
circumstances facing the corporate endeavor and challenging its continued
prosperity and survival. It may also be used opportunistically (or may
opportunistically not be used at all) by a corporate board shirking its
functional capabilities. Bainbridge acknowledges that a complete theory of
the firm requires one to explain how the ‘virtues of discretion’ are balanced

278. Bainbridge, Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 75, at 1749. See also Bainbridge,
Nexus of Contracts, supra note 75, at 7 (“At the core of the director primacy model therefore lies
the normative claim that the virtues of fiat, in terms of corporate decisionmaking efficiency, can
be ensured only by preserving the board’s decisionmaking authority from being trumped by either
shareholders or courts.”).
279. Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 605.
280. Cf. Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts, supra note 75, at 7; Bainbridge, The Means and Ends,
supra note 3, at 550.
281. Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts, supra note 75, at 7, 31 (“virtues of discretion”);
Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 573.
282. BAINBRIDGE, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 75; Bainbridge, The Means and
Ends, supra note 3, at 605; Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts, supra note 75, at 7.
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“against the need to require that discretion be used responsibly.”283
However, he then only posits that opportunism is simply “deterred by the
prospect of ex post sanctions, obviating the necessity of drafting a complete
contract ex ante.”284 Given that, as a matter of corporate law, the board’s
decisionmaking authority is nonreviewable by either shareholder or courts,
one seems to be left wondering what those ex post sanctions provided by
corporate law could be which deter board shirking within the director
primacy model. Certainly, the unenforceable, aspirational, and
‘contractarian’ idea of shareholder wealth maximization does not qualify as
such a deterrent.
It comes as no surprise, then, that Bainbridge has to revert to the same
‘quick fix’ in order to fill the gap in his model which Blair and Stout
utilized for the identical purpose in their team production model. He
analogizes corporate boards to production teams in which “mutual
monitoring and peer pressure provide a coercive backstop for a set of
interpersonal relationships founded on trust and other noncontractual social
norms.”285 Again, as in the team production model, these “key”286 social
norms coupled with reciprocal group monitoring of moral (i.e., not legal)
norm compliance provide the necessary “institutional constraint on agency
costs.”287 In other words, boards—as Platonic guardians and selfmonitoring hierarchs288— “voluntarily limit their discretion with respect to
the proper ends of corporate governance by embracing the shareholder
wealth maximization norm.”289 Thus, I argue that, ultimately, the
Bainbridge director primacy model ends up at exactly the same conclusion
that the Blair/Stout team production model appears to arrive at (even though
both models, at least, implicitly deny that they get to such conclusion by not
making it explicitly)—namely, that corporate law has nothing to provide
when it comes to the second, substantive question of corporate governance
(“Whose Interest(s) Control(s)?”).
B. AN ABSOLUTE DIRECTOR PRIMACY MODEL
Table 2 outlines, in a nutshell, how the absolute director primacy model
radically differs from the four current microtheoretical models of the firm
283. Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts, supra note 75, at 31. Accord BAINBRIDGE, THEORY AND
PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 73; Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 573.
284. Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts, supra note 75, at 20. See also BAINBRIDGE, THEORY AND
PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 74 (“[T]here must be some system of ex post governance: some
mechanism for detecting and punishing shirking.”) (emphasis added).
285. Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts, supra note 75, at 28; BAINBRIDGE, THEORY AND
PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 101.
286. BAINBRIDGE, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 101.
287. Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts, supra note 75, at 29. Accord BAINBRIDGE, THEORY AND
PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 102 (“important constraints on behavior”).
288. BAINBRIDGE, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 103.
289. Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 580 (emphasis added).

396

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 5

discussed above and why, in general, microtheoretical models (i.e., those
that concentrate on the inner workings of the firm290) are unable to explain
and predict why the genius of American corporate law does not (more)
regularly deteriorate into totalitarian corporate boards which misuse their
absolute decisionmaking authority to the detriment of every other firm
participant involved.
Table 2: Absolute Director Primacy Model
Model

“Who Controls?”

Absolute
Director
Primacy

board
(as a decisionmaker
by fiat, i.e., as a
modern Leviathan)

“Whose Interest(s)
Control(s)?”
indeterminable
within current
models because of
directors’ absolute
decisionmaking
power

Main Locus
in Figure 1
Quadrants
I & III

None of the microtheoretical models of the firm discussed above
ventures into Quadrant III in Figure 1. The absolute director primacy model
does and fills Quadrant III, as well as Quadrant I, in their entirety. It thereby
posits not only that the board of directors is a sui generis decisionmaker
with unlimited authority within corporate law (thus, restating—but more
radically—what Stephen Bainbridge has already developed in his director
primacy model), but also, and more importantly, that, as a matter of
corporate law, there is no overriding firm participant interest that controls
outcomes or guides the board decisionmaker. When comparing the absolute
director primacy model to the Blair/Stout team production model on the one
hand and Bainbridge’s director primacy model on the other hand, one could
summarize that: (i) the Blair/Stout model provides a good descriptive (but
no normative) answer to the second question of corporate governance,
“Whose Interest(s) Control(s)?”; (ii) the Bainbridge director primacy model
provides a good descriptive (but, likewise, no normative) answer to the first
question of corporate governance, “Who Controls?”; and (iii) both such
answers are now combined and synthesized in the absolute director
primacy model. Put graphically, the combination of Quadrants II & IV of
the team production model with Quadrant I of the director primacy model
results in Quadrants I & III of the absolute director primacy model.
Noticeably, the absolute director primacy model can be viewed as the exact
opposite of the team production model. Whereas team production insists on
decisionmaker accountability and, thus, occupies Quadrants II & IV, the
absolute director primacy model denies that any meaningful modicum of
290. Cf. Millon, supra note 4, at 202.
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director accountability exists in American corporate law. Consequently, it is
situated—at least, for the time being—in all of Quadrants I & III.
By locating the absolute director primacy model in Quadrants I & III, I
obviously am rejecting the notion that any accountability mechanism exists
in American corporate law that would allow firm participants, prior to
making their firm-specific investment, to predict with some accuracy how
the board of directors will behave in certain situations—thus, how the
return on their investment as well as its probability are going to be
controlled by such decisionmaker behavior. By necessity and design, the
law of fiduciary duties of corporate decisionmakers is open-ended—both
with regard to its means as well as its ends.291 Under the business judgment
rule,292 directors can act in any way they see fit and without having to worry
about any judicial review and second-guessing as long as the court, in
applying the business judgment rule presumption, can on its own—sua
sponte—provide some (even the most remote) rational basis for why the
board of directors might have believed—honestly and in good faith—that
its decision was (ultimately) in the best interest of the corporation.293
Therefore, directors are granted full discretion to act opportunistically—
unfettered by any further legal constraint—and to favor any particular cause
or firm participant interest over any and all others at any point in time as
long as: (i) no controlling economic self-interest of directors is actualized
(and remains unsanitized) in the decision; (ii) basic process due care is
complied with; and (iii) some rudimentary (and, possibly, entirely
hypothetical) rational explanation can be construed as to why the prevailing
consensus at the time of the board action might have been that the
corporation could ultimately benefit in some (tangible or intangible) shape
or form.294
The difference between the absolute director primacy model and the
four microtheoretical models discussed above is therefore as follows: Each
of the four models posits that, in one form or the other, one only needs to
determine the controlling interests or norms guiding corporate
decisionmaking. Once such a determination of decision-guiding interests
has been accomplished, it controls the exercise of decisionmaking latitude
(i.e., it controls the decisionmakers themselves) and, therefore, not only
291. Cf. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 13, at 677; Allen, Contracts and Communities,
supra note 5, at 1398.
292. For an explanation of the business judgment rule, see supra note 87.
293. Apart from sale or liquidation scenarios (in which major assets of the corporation would be
squandered away by the board for trifles), it seems impossible to come up with any short-, mid- or
long-term operational decision that we as lawyers cannot trace back to some half-baked rational
motivation (and, of course, it does not matter whether such motivation was actually underlying the
board decision or is merely hypothetical). Therefore, all operational decisions—as long as they
comply with process due care and are made by disinterested directors—receive the absolutist
protective shield of the business judgment rule.
294. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 110; Blair & Stout, Team
Production, supra note 49, at 746; Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 77, at 6.
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results in ex-post accountability but, because of such existant accountability
mechanism, provides pre-investment predictability and post-investment risk
measurability—all with varying degrees as per the applicable model.
The absolute director primacy model reverses this thinking. What we
can determine is where decisionmaking control is situated and that it should
be considered sui generis and absolute. Once this determination has been
made, it controls the actuation of firm participant interests in any manner,
thus, in an autocratic and inherently unpredictable manner. Therefore, the
absolute director primacy model—for the time being—not only results in a
complete lack of ex-post accountability but, because of such lack of an
accountability mechanism, also results in total ex-ante indeterminability.
III. CLOSING SKETCHES
The absolute director primacy model developed herein leads to three
main conclusions (though they may be preliminary):
1. The first conclusion can be equated to an answer for the first
(procedural) question of corporate governance: “Who Control(s)?”. We
may not like the answer, but I am convinced that the board of directors of a
Berle-Means corporation is the private-sector equivalent of a modern
Leviathan.295 Neither shareholders in aggregate nor the corporation itself
but the board is the corporate sovereign—both de facto and de jure. Its
decisionmaking is by fiat296 and its decisionmaking authority to run the
corporation’s business as it sees fit is absolute,297 original,298 infinite,299 and,

295. Cf. Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5, at 1396.
Under the liberal-utilitarian model, the law creating and protecting property rights
and the law enforcing contracts is the law of greatest importance to our welfare. The
legal value of the highest rank in this classical liberal view is, I suppose, human liberty,
and the greatest evil is oppression by the leviathan state.
Id. (footnote omitted).
296. Such authoritative decisional determination by the board is—in the genuine meaning of the
term ‘fiat’—both dictatorial and, ipse dixit, valid. It is non-reviewable and, ipso facto, irrebuttably
assumed to be right (which, of course, is exactly the effect of the courts’ application of the
business judgment rule). See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (“The
business judgment rule exists to protect and promote full and free exercise of the managerial
power granted to Delaware directors.”) (citing Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782
(Del. 1981)); BAINBRIDGE, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 38–45.
297. Cf. HOWARD H. SPELLMAN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF LAW GOVERNING
CORPORATE DIRECTIONS 5 (1931) (“[M]odern decisions tend toward an emphasis of the
directors’ absolutism in the management of the affairs of large corporations; the board of directors
has achieved a super-control of corporate management and of the corporations legal relations . . .
.”) (emphasis added); Horwitz, supra note 169, at 214 (“But modern corporate legislation, passed
during the first quarter of the twentieth century, ratified a new ‘absolutism’ that courts themselves
had already begun to bestow upon corporate directors.”) (emphasis added). See also Blair & Stout,
Corporate Law, supra note 74, at 251.
298. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
299. Cf. Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., supra note 49, at 190.
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thus, sui generis.300 Comparable to the Hobbesian bellum omnium contra
omnes within the sovereign state,301 the corporate entity or aggregation is
ineluctably characterized by perpetual conflicts among self-interested
corporate constituents.302 In order to manage—not solve (since they are
insolvable)—those conflicts which present a perennial, systemic risk to the
internal cohesion, adaptability, and, thus, prosperity and ultimate survival of
the firm, corporate law has to allocate infinite and absolute decisionmaking
authority within one core group of corporate constituents who are thus
called upon to attend to, and decide with non-reviewable finality, all those
matters of firm sustainability on behalf of the whole—i.e., the corporation
(whether seen as a separate entity or as an aggregation of firm
participants).303 American corporate law is unmistakably clear as to who
such single core group of corporate constituents is: the board of directors.304

The power and control that are present in all fiduciary relationships is exaggerated in
the corporation where the indeterminate length of the enterprise and the practically
infinite array of investment opportunities for the corporation make any possibility of
specified limitations on directors’ power or ongoing control by the stockholders
unrealistic.
Id.

300. Sui generis decisionmaking authority of corporate directors means that their
decisionmaking power is non-derivative. In particular, shareholder primacy models incorrectly
assume that the decisionmaking authority of corporate boards is derivative (i.e., delegated to
corporate boards by the shareholder franchise—at least, through the mechanism of board elections
during which shareholders vote). This assumption ignores the de lege lata reality of board
authority. See Dooley, supra note 11, at 467 (describing the problem of allocating authority within
the corporate firm as “the universally recognized requirement for the establishment of, and vesting
of supreme authority in, the board of directors”) (emphasis added).
At some point at the beginning of the twentieth century, American legal opinion
began decisively to shift to the view that “the powers of the board of directors . . . are
identical with the powers of the corporation.” Earlier, the dominant view, as expressed
by the United States Supreme Court, was that “when the charter was silent, the ultimate
determination of the management of the corporate affairs rests with its stock holders.”
Horwitz, supra note 169, at 214 (citations omitted).
301. That is, “war of all against all.” THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN OR THE MATTER, FORM
AND POWER OF A COMMONWEALTH, ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVIL, ch. XIII, at 64 (2d ed., 1886)
(“Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in
awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against
every man.”); THOMAS HOBBES, ELEMENTA PHILOSOPHICA DE CIVE, Præfatio (1642)
(“[C]onditionem hominum extra societatem civilem (quam conditionem appellare liceat statum
naturae) aliam non esse quam bellum omnium contra omnes; atque in eo bello jus esse omnibus in
omnia.”). Cf. Peter J. Burke & Jan E. Stets, Trust and Commitment Through Self-Verification, 62
SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 347, 347 (1999).
302. Cf. Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra note 3, at 599.
303. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION, supra note 68, at 69 (“Under conditions of widely
dispersed information and the need for speed in decisions, authoritative control at the tactical level
is essential for success.”); Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5; Bainbridge, The
Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 552; Dooley, supra note 11, at 466.
304. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 72 (stating that: (i) shareholders have
“virtually no power to control” the business and affairs of the corporation; (ii) the board of
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“The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter
shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as
may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of
incorporation.”305
A corporate board can act completely opportunisticly and unfettered by
legal constraints once it refrains from: (i) gross negligence in its
decisionmaking process (which gross negligence would additionally have to
be well documented and information thereof would have to be widely
disseminated);306 (ii) bad faith conduct (which bad faith conduct would also
have to be well documented and information thereof would have to be
widely disseminated);307 and (iii) purely self-interested transactions that are
seen as disloyal under the law.308 In the Berle-Means corporation, a welladvised corporate board always meets those minimal standards.
Accordingly, in light of our American corporate law ‘on the books,’ a
disinterested corporate board is virtually uncontrollable.
2. My second conclusion is less straightforward. It relates to the second
(substantive) question of corporate governance: “Whose Interest(s)
Control(s)?”. As outlined above, this question circumscribes the second
core function of any corporate governance system. After having allocated
absolute, original, infinite, and sui generis authority for making adaptive
decisions for firm sustainability in a core group of decisionmakers (as per
my first conclusion above, the board of directors), the corporate governance
system should also define the norms and interests that should guide the
internal decisionmakers in their decisionmaking. Otherwise, any exercise of
authority would always be arbitrary. An uncontrollable board of directors
would also always be ‘out-of-control.’ Similarly, the autocratic board of
directors would also be better described as a totalitarian institution of
governance.
Thus, the extent to which the board of directors as sovereign may
exercise its authority on behalf of the corporation—even if absolute,
directors and senior management “effectively controls;” and (iii) “[a]s a doctrinal matter,
moreover, corporate law essentially carves this separation into stone”); COX & HAZEN, supra note
4, at 149 (stating that the board of directors “is legally the supreme authority in matters of the
corporation’s regular business management”). See also Franklin A. Gevurtz, The European
Origins and the Spread of the Corporate Board of Directors, 33 STETSON L. REV. 925, 925
(2004) (“Around the world, the legal norm is that corporations are managed by, or under the
direction of, a board of directors.”) (footnote omitted).
305. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2010). See also REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01
(1984). Under the corporation statutes of all states, corporations are managed by or under the
direction of a board of directors as the statutory default rule. See, e.g., Dent, Jr., supra note 97, at
1216; Gevurtz, Origins of the Corporate Board, supra note 76, at 92; Ribstein, Why
Corporations?, supra note 49, at 188.
306. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985); Stout, Proper Motives,
supra note 77, at 6.
307. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006); Stone v. Ritter, 911
A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
308. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49, at 746.
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infinite, and sui generis—must be conditional on ‘something.’ In Thomas
Hobbes’s Leviathan model, it is natural law that obligates, thus, controls the
sovereign—though such condition is to be understood as a moral, not a
legal, obligation. In other words, it is a protolegal obligation, unenforceable
in a court of law. I cautioned above that it might not be possible—at least,
not within the confines of our current corporate governance system in
itself—to locate the norms and interests which ultimately bind (or, at least,
guide) absolute director primacy to the best interests of the corporation. My
second conclusion, therefore, is that a satisfactory answer to the second,
substantive question of corporate governance is logically indeterminable
within current microtheoretical models of the firm. We have to consider
model-transcending protolegal variables309 (for example, any applicable
‘moral’ obligations)—as perhaps only transient bases of ex-ante
determinability and ex-post accountability—and explain their external,
exogenous influence310 over current microtheoretical models of the firm,311
in order to properly model the firm-internal intricacies of corporate
governance with sufficient predictive ability.
3. Finally, as my third conclusion, I need to declare that all of this
leaves the absolute director primacy model (at least, for the time being)
with a fundamental, yet unexplained, dilemma312—namely, the somewhat
preliminary and uncomfortable result that the board of directors in a BerleMeans corporation is not only autocratic, it can be totalitarian if, when, and
where it so pleases.313 As a matter of corporate law, the board of directors is
akin to an ‘unguided missile.’ If there are no recognizable and enforceable
decision-guiding norms or principles within corporate law, many—if not,
309. “In the parlance of economics,” there is, however, the risk that these variables turn out to
be “observable, but not verifiable.” Hart, Norms and Theory, supra note 96. See also Blair &
Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 419 n.35; Rock & Wachter, Norms & Corporate
Law, supra note 5, at 1617.
310. Cf. Hart, Norms and Theory, supra note 96.
311. Cf. Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5, at 1397 (describing how proponents
of the social model of human interaction see the utility of law resting “in part on presupposition of
shared norms including those of fairness and trust”).
312. Cf. Blair & Stout, Trust, supra note 70 (calling this dilemma a “riddle” of corporate law);
Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 77, at 8 (describing this dilemma as a “basic mystery”).
313. Cf. Blair & Stout, Trust, supra note 70, at 1791 (“The net result is that, as a practical
matter, a negligent director is more likely to be hit by lightning after leaving her board meeting
than she is to pay damages.”); Jones, supra note 90, at 117 (“Independent directors face an
infinitesimal risk of paying personally for damages to the corporation caused by their breach of
fiduciary duty.”); Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., supra note 49, at 190 (stating that “directors
have largely unlimited power over the corporation and its affairs”); Stout, Proper Motives, supra
note 77, at 6–7. See also Alces, supra note 125, at 242.
It is dangerous and costly to assume that fiduciary duties function well in the corporate
context. The assumption may give shareholders a false sense of security or a belief that
they are able to discipline management effectively when in fact, because of the very
limited nature of corporate governance duties, they are not.
Id.
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infinite—avenues are available in order to make adaptive corporate
decisions. This, inevitably, creates significant room for opportunism (since
it is uncertainty which always opens the realm of opportunism—good or
bad) and, thus, economic agency costs.314 In turn, as a firm participant, one
seems to be relegated to only something like ‘hope’315 (or—more to the
point—’trust,’ ‘loyalty,’ and similar socio-contextual,316 behavior-oriented
and reciprocal317 variables318 based on pre-coded ‘expectations,’ ‘counterexpectations,’ and ‘expectation-expectations’ and aimed at reducing social
complexity319)—whether reasonable or not—that directors know what they
do, that they have internalized the correct moral compass,320 and, thus, will
‘do the right thing’321 more often than not.322 But ‘hope’—maybe even illfounded in many cases—is not something that we can and should accept as
a satisfactory explanation and basis for the daily phenomenon of general
investor confidence pre-investment in the face of absent director
accountability post-investment.323 The question simply becomes: if profitmaximizing is not enforced by corporate law, why does it nonetheless
happen—as a matter of almost overwhelming routine—in today’s corporate
reality?324 An attempt at answering this question must therefore, in my
314. See Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 77, at 4 (stating that, if we only consider financial
rewards to directors, i.e., make assumptions based only on rational selfish behavior of directors,
“directors seem to have little reason to break a sweat in the boardroom”).
315. Cf. Id. at 18 (stating that “we must inevitably rely on directors’ internalized sense of
responsibility as their primary if not their sole motive for exercising judgment and care”)
(emphasis added).
316. See Id. at 13.
317. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
318. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
319. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
320. Cf. Elhauge, supra note 134, at 740 (“internalized moral norms”); Stout, Proper Motives,
supra note 77, at 23 (“internal gyroscope”).
321. Cf. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 439; Nadelle Grossman,
Director Compliance with Elusive Fiduciary Duties in a Climate of Corporate Governance
Reform, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 393, 465–66 (2007); Rock & Wachter, Norms &
Corporate Law, supra note 5; Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 77, at 9, 23. See also Meurer,
supra note 9, at 740 (stating with regard to the problem of unforeseeable contingencies in
transaction-cost-theory ‘contracting’ that “this begs the questions of how a firm gets managers to
be pure profit maximizers”).
322. To complicate things further, much of what happens in the corporate boardroom (and can
be hoped for to happen in the boardroom) depends on the particular corporation and follows the
(aspirational and prevailing) procedures, standards, and practices for director behavior of such
specific corporation. See, e.g., Rock & Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law, supra note 5.
323. Cf. Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., supra note 49, at 191 (“Why would anybody invest
money in a corporation, an institution over which she has no control?”); Stout, Proper Motives,
supra note 77, at 3, 8, 9.
324. See Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys. Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (stating
with regard to investors who trade shares in well-developed markets in reliance on the integrity of
the price set by the market that “it is hard to imagine that there ever is a buyer or seller who does
not rely on market integrity” and wondering “[w]ho would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked
crap game?”). Or formulated differently, the question is not only “why do shareholders in public
companies have so little power?”, see Stout, Mythical Benefits, supra note 92, at 792, but: why do
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judgment, thoroughly investigate the external, exogenous protolegal
influences—designated as controlling and compelling325 variables under the
absolute director primacy model developed herein—on the inner workings
of the firm.326
Apparently, many of us are also more than a bit uncomfortable327 with
the apparent absence of director accountability within American corporate
law. Professor Bainbridge, for example, has repeatedly described the board
of directors as “a sort of Platonic guardian” similar to the philosopher-kings
in Plato’s Republic.328 Those philosopher-kings always seem to see it fit to
rule “for the public good, not as though they were performing some heroic
action, but simply as a matter of duty.”329 Perhaps even more brazenly, there
is “Frank Knight’s mythic entrepreneur,” a “free market superhero,”330 who
is the ultimately responsible manager owning and controlling her (soleproprietor) business and doing what is right out of sheer self-motivation and
self-respect, thus, without any legal mandate being required or
operational.331
shareholders in public companies have so little power and still invest? Why do investors who
know that they have almost no power over their investment ex post (other than investment exit
with a predictable loss of value) still confidently decide to invest without any ex ante bargainedfor accountability in place? Cf. Stout, Mythical Benefits, supra note 92, at 801 (pointing out “an
often overlooked fact of business life: investors are not forced to purchase shares in public
corporations at gunpoint”); id. at 803 (“Is it possible that shareholders, like Ulysses, sometimes
see advantage in ‘tying their own hands’ and ceding control over the corporation to directors
largely insulated from their own influence?”).
325. See Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 77, at 14.
326. Id. at 9. Of course, such investigation has already been commenced in both: (i) “the
economic literature on norms in organizations”—usually rubricated under the heading of “selfenforcing” or “self-governing” contracts, Hart, Norms and Theory, supra note 96, at 1703; Rock
& Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law, supra note 5, at 1609; 1613, and (ii) the legal academia
focused on the co-existence of (corporate) law and norms and the latter’s influence on (and,
maybe, over) the former—the so-called “law and norms” literature. See, e.g., Rock & Wachter,
Islands of Conscious Power, supra note 8.
327. Cf. Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49, at 744 (describing a “growing sense of
unease among many corporate scholars, a sense that the principle-agent model may not tell the
whole story”).
328. Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts, supra note 75, at 8, 33; Bainbridge, Convergence Debate,
supra note 2, at 51; Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 550–51 n.21.
329. Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts, supra note 75, at 8 n.28 (quoting PLATO, THE REPUBLIC
289–90 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Random House 1991)) (emphasis added); Bainbridge,
Convergence Debate, supra note 2, at 51 n.38; Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at
551 n.21. This guardianship concept seems to correlate with “[n]eoclassical [economic] theory
[which] views the firm as a set of feasible production plans . . . over [which] a selfless and
compliant manager [presides].” Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 4, at 299. Similarly, Adolf
Berle viewed “the emergence of independent corporate managers as a [beneficial] development . .
. [namely], a mechanism for producing truly public-regarding servants.” Romano, Metapolitics,
supra note 48, at 923–24 (citing BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 356). See also ADOLF A.
BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN POLITICAL
ECONOMY 2–3, 8 (1959).
330. Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra note 3, at 605.
331. See KNIGHT, supra note 4, at 270. See also BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 356 (arguing
that society could recognize corporate management with absolute powers that were constraint only
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Obviously, we cannot find evidence of Platonic guardians or Knightian
entrepreneurs in our American corporate law as it is currently ‘on the
books’ (nor can we find much evidence of them in the reality of
corporations and corporate boards in order to be sufficiently comforted that
we could, and do, live without any accountability mechanism at work).332
Rather, I suspect that we are again talking—if even so briefly, peripherally,
and nonchalantly—about model-external protolegal variables which we
seem to presuppose and import wholesale into our corporate governance
system without any apparent need to explain or account for such variables
underlying our respective models. In other words, we just ‘borrow’
legitimacy (and, apparently, with it accountability) from outside the law in
order to close the uncomfortably wide gap left within our models of the
firm as regards their predictive ability and, thus, their overall accuracy.333
Unless we are prepared to accept that the corporate board of directors, by
law, is designed as an ‘unguided missile’ that lacks inner legitimacy and
intelligibility (all of which I am neither ready nor willing to accept), we
should set out and determine, deconstruct and explain those protolegal
variables which our microtheoretical models of the firm critically depend
upon and which make corporate governance and the genius of American
corporate law autocratic and elitist but not—at least, not as a matter of
regular course—also totalitarian.334

by management’s sense of morality and public duty); O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern
Corporation, supra note 4, at 758, 761.
332. Cf. McDonnell, supra note 75, at 157 (“Bainbridge is no fool—he is well aware that
director self-monitoring is far from a complete solution to the agency problem.”).
333. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
334. Or to say it more bluntly: I assume that most of us expect countries like Greece, Denmark,
Ireland, or Portugal, see supra text accompanying note 37,—or, for that matter, any country—to
have a stable, maybe tripartite, form of national government where sturdy checks and balances
exist among the branches of government and where the rule of law is firmly established—at least,
in principle and as a matter of due course. In comparison thereto, I do not understand why most of
us seem to be fine with the fact that an economic behemoth like Wal-Mart can be a pure-bred
oligopoly where a mere sixteen individuals (i.e., its board of directors)—with, arguably, an
overwhelmingly large degree of financial, class and career ‘inbreeding’—can decide the affairs of
an economic undertaking that rivals some of the largest and most sophisticated national economies
in the world—all without much legal oversight, if any. Either corporate boards, as decisionmakers
by fiat, lack legitimacy—or our corporate law, conferring absolute primacy and by-fiat
decisionmaking authority to corporate directors, lacks legitimacy. Cf. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW,
supra note 13, at 22.
That is, unless we can find a way to explain legitimacy as well as its sources. We therefore
need to embark on a serious deconstruction exercise if we want to satisfactorily explain the
societal value of putting the twenty-eighth largest economy on this globe in 2008 in the hands of
sixteen elitist, absolutist and possibly totalitarian decisionmakers without any measurable legal
accountability. Cf. Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra note 3, at 604 n.21 (asking
whether “we want to encourage an institution that is disproportionately white, male and
conservative to make social policy?”); Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 77.

